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ABSTRACT: Since 1967, when it decided Katz v. United States, the 
Supreme Court has tied the right to be free of unwanted govern-
ment scrutiny to the concept of reasonable expectations of privacy.1 
An evaluation of reasonable expectations depends, among other 
factors, upon an assessment of the intrusiveness of government ac-
tion. When making such assessment historically the Court consid-
ered police conduct with clear temporal, geographic, or substantive 
limits. However, in an era where new technologies permit the stor-
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age and compilation of vast amounts of personal data, things are 
becoming more complicated. A school of thought known as “mosa-
ic theory” has stepped into the void, ringing the alarm that our old 
tools for assessing the intrusiveness of government conduct poten-
tially undervalue privacy rights. 
Mosaic theorists advocate a cumulative approach to the evalua-
tion of data collection. Under the theory, searches are “analyzed as 
a collective sequence of steps rather than as individual steps.”2 The 
approach is based on the observation that comprehensive aggrega-
tion of even seemingly innocuous data reveals greater insight than 
consideration of each piece of information in isolation. Over time, 
discrete units of surveillance data can be processed to create a mo-
saic of habits, relationships, and much more. Consequently, a 
Fourth Amendment analysis that focuses only on the government’s 
collection of discrete units of data fails to appreciate the true harm 
of long-term surveillance—the composite. 
In the context of location tracking, the Court has previously 
suggested that the Fourth Amendment may (at some theoretical 
threshold) be concerned with the accumulated information revealed 
by surveillance.3 Similarly, in the Court’s recent decision in United 
States v. Jones, a majority of concurring justices indicated willingness 
to explore such an approach.4 However, in general, the Court has 
rejected any notion that technological enhancement matters to the 
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constitutional treatment of location tracking.5 Rather, it has decided 
that such surveillance in public spaces, which does not require 
physical trespass, is equivalent to a human tail and thus not regu-
lated by the Fourth Amendment. In this way, the Court has avoided 
a quantitative analysis of the amendment’s protections. 
The Court’s reticence is built on the enticingly direct assertion 
that objectivity under the mosaic theory is impossible. This is true 
in large part because there has been no rationale yet offered to ob-
jectively distinguish relatively short-term monitoring from its coun-
terpart of greater duration.6 This article suggests that by combining 
the lessons of machine learning with the mosaic theory and apply-
ing the pairing to the Fourth Amendment we can see the contours 
of a response. Machine learning makes clear that mosaics can be 
created. Moreover, there are important lessons to be learned on 
when this is the case. 
Machine learning is the branch of computer science that studies 
systems that can draw inferences from collections of data, generally 
by means of mathematical algorithms. In a recent competition, “The 
Nokia Mobile Data Challenge,” 7  researchers evaluated machine 
learning’s applicability to GPS and cell phone tower data. From a 
user’s location history alone, the researchers were able to estimate 
                                                          
 
 
 
5 Compare Knotts, 460 U.S. at 276 (rejecting the contention that an electronic beeper 
should be treated differently than a human tail) and Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
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the user’s gender, marital status, occupation and age.8 Algorithms 
developed for the competition were also able to predict a user’s 
likely future location by observing past location history. The predic-
tion of a user’s future location could be even further improved by 
using the location data of friends and social contacts.9 
Machine learning of the sort on display during the Nokia com-
petition seeks to harness the data deluge of today’s information so-
ciety by efficiently organizing data, finding statistical regularities 
and other patterns in it, and making predictions therefrom. Ma-
chine learning algorithms are able to deduce information—
including information that has no obvious linkage to the input da-
ta—that may otherwise have remained private due to the natural 
limitations of manual and human-driven investigation. Analysts 
can train machine learning programs using one dataset to find simi-
lar characteristics in new datasets. When applied to the digital 
“bread crumbs” of data generated by people, machine learning al-
gorithms can make targeted personal predictions. The greater the 
number of data points evaluated, the greater the accuracy of the 
algorithm’s results. 
In five parts, this article advances the conclusion that the dura-
tion of investigations is relevant to their substantive Fourth 
Amendment treatment because duration affects the accuracy of the 
predictions. Though it was previously difficult to explain, for ex-
ample, why an investigation of four weeks was substantively dif-
ferent from an investigation of four hours, we now have a better 
                                                          
 
 
 
8 Sanja Brdar, Dubravko Culibrk & Vladimir Crnojevic, Demographic Attributes 
Prediction on the Real-World Mobile Data, MOBILE DATA CHALLENGE WORKSHOP 2012, 
https://research.nokia.com/files/public/mdc-final202-brdar.pdf 
9 Manlio de Domenico, Antonio Lima & Mirco Musolesi, Interdependence and Pre-
dictability of Human Mobility and Social Interactions, MOBILE DATA CHALLENGE 
WORKSHOP 2012, https://research.nokia.com/files/public/mdc-
final306_dedomenico.pdf. 
2014]      MOSAIC THEORY & MACHINE LEARNING   
 
 
 
559 
understanding of the value of aggregated data when viewed 
through a machine learning lens. In some situations, predictions of 
startling accuracy can be generated with remarkably few data 
points. Furthermore, in other situations accuracy can increase dra-
matically above certain thresholds. For example, a 2012 study found 
the ability to deduce ethnicity moved sideways through five weeks 
of phone data monitoring, jumped sharply to a new plateau at that 
point, and then increased sharply again after twenty-eight weeks.10 
Similarly, the accuracy of identification of a target’s significant oth-
er improved dramatically after five days’ worth of data inputs.11 
Experiments like these support the notion of a threshold, a point at 
which it makes sense to draw a Fourth Amendment line. 
In order to provide an objective basis for distinguishing be-
tween law enforcement activities of differing duration, the results of 
machine learning algorithms can be combined with notions of pri-
vacy metrics, such as k-anonymity or l-diversity. While reasonable 
minds may dispute the most suitable minimum accuracy threshold, 
this article makes the case that the collection of data points allowing 
predictions that exceed selected thresholds should be generally 
deemed unreasonable searches in the absence of a warrant.12 More-
over, any new rules should take into account not only the data be-
ing collected but also the foreseeable improvements in the machine 
learning technology that will ultimately be brought to bear on it; 
this includes using future algorithms on older data. 
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In 2001, the Supreme Court asked “what limits there are upon 
the power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed priva-
cy.”13 In this study, we explore an answer and investigate what les-
sons there are in the power of technology to protect the realm of 
guaranteed privacy. After all, as technology takes away, it also 
gives. The objective understanding of data compilation and analysis 
that is revealed by machine learning provides important Fourth 
Amendment insights. We should begin to consider these insights 
more closely. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Olmstead v. United States,14 the first wiretap case considered 
by the Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment was interpreted 
very narrowly. The Court asserted that only physical searches of 
“material things—the person, the house, his papers or his effects” 
were relevant under the Fourth Amendment.15 In Katz v. United 
States,16 though, the Court reversed this interpretation, saying “the 
reach of the Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence 
of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.”17 Since the Court 
decided Katz in 1967 technology has moved further, and the scope 
of the Fourth Amendment is again being challenged by invention. 
One particularly thorny issue of Fourth Amendment analysis is 
location tracking: is a warrant required to track someone with the 
aid of a technological device? At first glance, the answer would 
seem to be “no.” Following someone was hardly a new concept in 
1789, when the amendment was introduced into the first Congres-
sional session. It is not obvious why technology would change this. 
The question, then, is this: can newer and perhaps more invasive 
location tracking technology constitute a difference sufficient to 
bring location tracking under the ambit of the Fourth Amendment? 
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In the only modern location tracking case to reach the Supreme 
Court thus far, United States v. Jones,18 many expected that the ques-
tion would need to be answered. However, as it turned out, tech-
nology did not play a role for the holding of the Jones Court. Rather, 
since a tracking device had been attached to Jones’s car, the police 
actions were held to squarely fall within classic Fourth Amendment 
doctrine: there had been an unauthorized physical intrusion, so a 
warrant was required independent of the location tracking. As indi-
cated in the concurring opinions, though, 19  five of the justices 
seemed prepared to move further than the majority opinion did. 
However, these concurring opinions failed to conclusively identify 
what test should be used to analyze the relevance of modern loca-
tion tracking technology under the Fourth Amendment. 
One proposed test has been labeled the “mosaic theory.” Under 
the mosaic theory, identifying searches that trigger Fourth 
Amendment protection requires the analysis of police actions, each 
of which may not qualify as a search when viewed in isolation but 
which over time reveal a collective “mosaic” of behavior and char-
acteristics.20 That is, it is the totality of information gathered that 
makes a search unreasonable. Such a collection of information is 
more than the sum of its parts; the inferences that can be drawn go 
far beyond the individual observations.21 It need not be stressed 
that data mining and other modern technologies allow even more 
detailed mosaics to be developed. 
                                                          
 
 
 
18 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
19 See id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring). 
20 Kerr, supra note 2. 
21  See, e.g., Renée Hutchins, Tied up in Knots? GPS Technology and the Fourth 
Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 458 (2007) (stating that the “[police] could generate 
and compare such records for weeks or months at a time to develop a comprehen-
sive digest of [a person’s] friends, associates, preferences, and desires”). 
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In particular, one branch of computer science, machine learn-
ing, can cause concern when it comes to privacy and large datasets. 
Machine learning is just what it sounds like: it is a way for comput-
ers to “deduce” patterns in datasets and use those patterns to do 
further analysis. Specifically, in supervised machine learning, an 
analyst can “train” a machine learning program using one dataset. 
The patterns derived can then be used to find the same characteris-
tics in new datasets.22 
One recent use of machine learning technology is location pre-
diction.23 Given a training dataset of location data, such as GPS 
tracking logs, a suitable program can look at a new dataset and 
make predictions with some degree of accuracy, including where 
someone is likely to be in the future. In other words, such programs 
are in a strong sense a technological exemplar of the mosaic theory: 
based on prior knowledge, they can predict behavioral patterns and 
characteristics of a subject, accumulating information into a picture 
of increasing completeness. 
Such technological advances have largely been viewed as a 
source of concern for privacy activists. However, as technology 
takes away, it also gives. We posit that viewing the Fourth 
Amendment protection through the lens of machine learning offers 
important legal guidance. The main idea is this: If there are enough 
data points that allow for predictions above a certain threshold of 
accuracy, a mosaic exists. Thus, for the grouping problem—the 
problem of identifying which data points a set must contain to 
transform it into a mosaic24—we claim that the set must be com-
posed of points that enable predictions above a certain threshold of 
accuracy. Collection of data in excess of the threshold established by 
                                                          
 
 
 
22 Machine learning is explained in more detail. See infra Section II. 
23 See, e.g., de Domenico et al., supra note 9. 
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experiments involving machine learning is a priori an unreasonable 
search.25 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: We start 
with a review of the relevant legal and technological background. 
Specifically, we give an overview of Fourth Amendment law in the 
context of location tracking (Section I.); we then provide an intro-
duction to machine learning (Section II.) and discuss privacy met-
rics, which are mathematical and statistical models aimed at quanti-
fying “privacy” (Section III.). Then we present our major contribu-
tions: a demonstration of how sufficient data lets us build a func-
tional mosaic. That is, by using machine learning techniques on a 
given amount of data it is possible to make useful predictions, predic-
tions that go beyond what is actually known, and that are relevant 
to the Fourth Amendment’s analysis of location tracking (Section 
IV.). Finally, we summarize our contributions (Section V.). 
 
I. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the “right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.”26 In the early years, this language 
was understood quite literally. 27  Routinely interpreting the 
amendment narrowly, the Supreme Court stated that it protected 
                                                          
 
 
 
25 The issue of what sort of authorization should be needed for location tracking 
can be looked at from a legislative dimension as well. See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 
12. 
26 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
27 See, e.g., Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 120 (1942) (“[T]he unlawful in-
terception of a telephone communication does not amount to a search or seizure 
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.”) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 
438 (1928)); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942). 
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against little more than physical intrusions by law enforcement.28 
By the late 1960s, however, law enforcement was increasingly able 
to gain access to information about private affairs without actual 
incursion into protected spaces. The Court (or at least a majority of 
its members) became more and more concerned about a world of 
unregulated government surveillance. This concern led the Court to 
the realization that a more robust interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment was needed. 
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE “REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF 
PRIVACY” 
In 1967, in Katz v. United States, the Court settled upon an un-
derstanding of the amendment that used the concept of a person’s 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” as the boundary line of protec-
tion.29 Justice Harlan explained in his concurring opinion that this 
boundary imposes “a twofold requirement, first that a person have 
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, 
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable[,]’” that is, it must be objectively reasonable.30 Rejecting 
its past fealty to the singular notion of trespass, the Court in Katz 
further explained that “the reach of [the Fourth] Amendment can-
not turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into 
any given enclosure.”31 Stating plainly its seeming analytical shift, 
                                                          
 
 
 
28 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
29 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
30 Id. at 361. Shortly after the decision in Katz was handed down the full Court 
adopted, in various majority opinions, the test articulated by Justice Harlan in his 
Katz concurrence. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (citing Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)). 
31 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
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the Court announced that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, 
not places.”32 
Under the Court’s evolved understanding of the amendment 
the heart of the inquiry shifted from explicit consideration of specif-
ic police tactics to a broader discussion about what society should 
reasonably be able to expect the police not to do. Rather than exam-
ining, for example, whether a police officer’s microphone had phys-
ically breached the bedroom threshold, the Court now considered 
whether society was bound to respect a personal desire that the po-
lice not listen in on pillow talk.33 In the post-Katz world, if the an-
swer to the latter inquiry was “no,” it mattered little how the police 
accomplished their eavesdropping. 
The beauty of the evolved construction was that its flexibility 
provided, at least theoretically, broader protection than the unyield-
ing physical invasion test. By focusing on society’s expectations of 
privacy and not on the narrow means that permitted official intru-
sion, the Court infused elasticity into the analysis that could be re-
sponsive to advances in technology. As Justice Harlan explained in 
Katz, the Court’s earlier trespass-based interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment “is, in the present day, bad physics as well as bad law, 
for reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by electron-
ic as well as physical invasion.”34 
Allowing the Court to define realms of protection based upon 
societal norms and not physical boundaries provided a flexibility 
that could erect zones of privacy independent of geography. 35 
However, the flexibility of the Court’s post-Katz analysis—
flexibility that was once lauded as its greatest attribute—has be-
come the focus of its greatest criticism. Following Katz, the mallea-
                                                          
 
 
 
32 Id. at 351. 
33 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
34 Id. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
35 Id. at 351. 
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bility of the standard was decried in both conservative and liberal 
circles as ruinous.36 With the increased flexibility, legitimate ques-
tions arose about how to draw clear lines around what was being 
protected. This struggle was seen most recently in the area of loca-
tion tracking and the Court’s decision in the Jones case.37 
B. LOCATION TRACKING AS PRIVACY VIOLATION 
Jones was a nightclub owner in the District of Columbia. He 
was also suspected by law enforcement of dealing drugs. Investigat-
ing their suspicions, the local police, working in concert with feder-
al agents, attached a GPS tracking device to Jones’s car. Based, in 
part, upon thousands of pages of location information gathered 
from the device over a four-week period, Jones was convicted of a 
drug trafficking conspiracy and other narcotics offenses. He was 
sentenced to life in prison. Because the police did not adhere to the 
limitations of the warrant they obtained, however, it became dis-
puted whether Jones’s reasonable expectation of privacy was con-
trolled by the Court’s earlier decision in United States v. Knotts,38 
which approved warrantless location tracking by means of an elec-
tronic beeper. While the prosecution argued for the application of 
Knotts, the defense sought to distinguish it. 
                                                          
 
 
 
36 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme 
Court, 1979 Sup .Ct. Rev. 173; Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., 
concurring); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 
757, 759 (1994) (“Fourth Amendment case law is a sinking ocean liner—rudderless 
and badly off course—yet most scholarship contents itself with rearranging the deck 
chairs.”); Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 1511, 1514 
(2010) (“We should sidestep the contentious debate about expectations of privacy. . . 
.”) 
37 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
38 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). 
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In the view of the defense, the GPS unit’s ability to collect and 
store massive amounts of detailed location tracking data for ex-
tended periods justified a different constitutional treatment. The 
defense argued that the enhanced technology represented a change 
in the substance of the investigation, not simply a change in the 
form of surveillance. The government in turn argued that it mat-
tered little whether it tracked Jones for two days or two months, 
whether it used an electronic beeper or a GPS unit. In the govern-
ment’s view, Jones had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements on public streets. The Jones case, thus, presented what 
many saw as a difficult but unavoidable choice between two com-
peting understandings of what it means to have a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy under Katz. To the delight of some and the dismay 
of others, however, the Court resolved the case without answering 
the question.39 
Rather than deciding whether the extended warrantless track-
ing violated Jones’s reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court 
instead found that the attachment of the tracking device to Jones’s 
car (coupled with the monitoring of that device) constituted a 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In a unani-
mous decision, the Court announced that the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy test adopted in Katz supplemented (rather than re-
placed) traditional trespass-based understandings of Fourth 
Amendment protection exemplified by the Court in Olmstead. 40 
Thus, after Jones, a violation of the Fourth Amendment can be estab-
                                                          
 
 
 
39 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012). 
40 Id. at 950 (holding that “for most of our history the Fourth Amendment was un-
derstood to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas 
(‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) it enumerates. Katz did not repudiate that 
understanding.”); id. at 952 (finding that “the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy 
test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”) (empha-
sis in original). 
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lished with a showing that law enforcement attempted to gather 
information either by an unauthorized physical intrusion of a pro-
tected space (the Olmstead test) or by invading reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy (the Katz test).41 In Jones’s case, where the monitor-
ing of his movements was accomplished by an unauthorized physi-
cal intrusion—attaching the device to the car—the Court held the 
conduct was unconstitutional on that ground alone.42 
The Court’s refusal to go further and resolve whether the gov-
ernment’s conduct in the case would have been unconstitutional 
under a straightforward application of Katz’s reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy test reflected the difficulty of translating the concept 
of objective reasonableness through a quantitative lens. As applica-
tion of that test presented tricky (and, in his view, unnecessary) 
questions of line drawing, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, 
stated: 
[I]t remains unexplained why a 4-week investigation is 
“surely” too long . . . . What of a 2-day monitoring of a sus-
pected purveyor of stolen electronics? Or of a 6-month 
monitoring of a suspected terrorist? We may have to grap-
ple with these “vexing problems” in some future case 
where a classic trespassory search is not involved and re-
                                                          
 
 
 
41 Id.; see also id. at 951 n.5 (finding that “[a] trespass on ‘houses’ or ‘effects’ or a 
Katz invasion of privacy, is not alone a search unless it is done to obtain information; 
and the obtaining of information is not alone a search unless it is achieved by such a 
trespass or invasion of privacy.”). 
42 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. In United States v. Katzin, 732 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2013) (va-
cated by, rehearing, en banc, granted by United States v. Katzin, LEXIS 24722 (3d Cir. 
2013)), the court discussed and rejected applicability of the automobile exception for 
warrantless searches. It found that attaching and monitoring a GPS tracker does not 
serve the purpose of the exception, which consists of permitting law enforcement to 
preserve existing evidence in an automobile that otherwise might be lost due to au-
tomobiles’ mobility. 
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sort must be had to the Katz analysis; but there is no reason 
for rushing forward to resolve them here.43 
Finding that the issue in Jones could be decided on physical intru-
sion grounds alone, the majority chose to avoid the “thornier” ques-
tions required to assess reasonable expectations of privacy. 
C. THE EMERGENCE OF THE MOSAIC THEORY 
The “thornier” questions identified by the Jones majority are 
addressed by what has come to be known as the “mosaic theory.”44 
This theory submits that a Fourth Amendment search can be under-
stood either as an individual act by the police or as a sequence of 
acts in a longer investigation. In the latter case, individual acts by 
the police are simply tiles in the mosaic; the full picture is what is 
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. The mosaic theory is seen 
as more protective of privacy because obtaining and analyzing the 
full mosaic may constitute a Fourth Amendment search even if 
none of the individual tiles trigger constitutional scrutiny. 
                                                          
 
 
 
43 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (citation omitted). 
44 The term “mosaic theory” was used by the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit in United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010) aff’d 
sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (“As with the ‘mosaic theory’ 
often invoked by the Government in cases involving national security information, 
‘What may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who 
has a broad view of the scene.’”) (citation omitted). As the court explained, the mosa-
ic theory originated in national security law, particularly, the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (FOIA), and is defined in 32 C.F.R. § 701.31 (2005) as “[t]he concept that 
apparently harmless pieces of information when assembled together could reveal a 
damaging picture.” The term was then referenced by law professor Orin Kerr in a 
blog post that he published the day the decision in Maynard was handed down. See 
Orin Kerr, D.C. Circuit Introduces ‘Mosaic Theory’ of Fourth Amendment, Holds GPS 
Monitoring a Fourth Amendment Search, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 6, 2010), available 
at http://volokh.com/2010/08/06/d-c-circuit-introduces-mosaic-theory-of-fourth-
amendment-holds-gps-monitoring-a-fourth-amendment-search. It has since been 
embraced by many scholars writing in the field. 
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Before the Jones case reached the Supreme Court, it had been 
analyzed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit using the mosaic theory.45 The court found that the extended 
surveillance of a target vehicle over the course of some twenty-eight 
days constituted a warrantless search that was prohibited by the 
Fourth Amendment. When the case reached the Supreme Court, the 
majority declined to adopt the mosaic theory articulated by the 
Maynard court. However, while the Court as a whole declined to 
wade into the fray, five justices (though divided on the precise de-
tails) did not share such reticence. As Justice Alito announced, “I 
would analyze the question presented in this case by asking wheth-
er respondent’s reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by 
the long-term monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he 
drove.”46 In keeping with this sentiment, the concurring justices in 
Jones in two separate opinions took the Katz inquiry head on and 
appear ready to overlay Katz’s objective reasonableness prong, in 
one form or another, with considerations of the mosaic theory.47 
                                                          
 
 
 
45 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. United 
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).  
46 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 958. 
47 Justice Alito’s concurring opinion endorsing a mosaic theory of privacy was 
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan. See Jones, 132 S. Ct at 957 (Alito, J., 
concurring). Justice Sotomayor also wrote separately. See id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor similarly expressed a willingness 
to infuse Katz with a quantitative understanding of objective reasonableness. Echoing 
the late Justice Marshall, Justice Sotomayor then went a step further, and urged re-
consideration of the third-party doctrine—a doctrine cited by earlier Courts to defeat 
Fourth Amendment protection in a host of cases, including Smith v. Maryland, 442 
U.S. 735, 744-45 (1979), where information was already disclosed to a third party. Id. 
at 957 (“This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great 
deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out 
mundane tasks.”). Indeed, some state constitutions do not adhere to the third party 
doctrine. For example, in New Jersey v. Earls, 214 N.J. 564 (2013), the Supreme Court 
of New Jersey concluded that the privacy protections in N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 7, 
which are similar to the Fourth Amendment, generally require law enforcement 
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For example, in her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor announced 
that, in assessing objective reasonableness under Katz, it is relevant 
that “GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of 
a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about 
her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associa-
tions.”48 Expressing more plainly her belief that the accumulation of 
even seemingly innocuous data points might be relevant to consti-
tutional protection, Justice Sotomayor wrote: 
I would take these attributes of GPS monitoring into ac-
count when considering the existence of a reasonable socie-
tal expectation of privacy in the sum of one’s public move-
ments. I would ask whether people reasonably expect that 
their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a 
manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or 
less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual hab-
its, and so on.49 
Writing for three fellow justices, Justice Alito, too, expressed 
support for the contention that the government’s accumulation of 
discrete location data points over a period of four weeks was de-
terminative of Katz’s objective reasonableness inquiry. In the view 
of these four justices: 
[T]he use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations 
of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy. For 
such offenses, society’s expectation has been that law en-
forcement agents and others would not—and indeed, in the 
main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue 
                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
officers to obtain a warrant when requesting cell phone location tracking data from 
third party phone service providers. 
48 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
49 Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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every single movement of an individual’s car for a very 
long period.50 
Significantly, the concurrences in Jones were built upon the 
Court’s decades-old observation in Knotts that a resource-intensive, 
round-the-clock, dragnet-type surveillance might justify different 
constitutional treatment than a low-cost surveillance by a single 
officer following a suspect in a car for a limited time period.51 
The concurring justices’ willingness to operationalize the obser-
vation in Knotts marked something of a departure from the Court’s 
prior cases. By and large, the Court’s past consideration of techno-
logically enhanced surveillance has treated new forms of surveil-
lance as changes in investigative form, not substance. 52  In the 
                                                          
 
 
 
50 Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
51 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283-84 (1983). 
52 See United States v. White, 401 U.S. at 745, 785 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(observing that “[t]he contention is, in essence, an argument that the distinction be-
tween third-party monitoring and other undercover techniques is one of form and 
not substance. The force of the contention depends on the evaluation of two separa-
ble but intertwined assumptions: first, that there is no greater invasion of privacy in 
the third-party situation, and, second, that uncontrolled consensual surveillance in 
an electronic age is a tolerable technique of law enforcement, given the values and 
goals of our political system.”). The Court’s decision in Kyllo v. United States is one 
clear exception to its general approach to enhanced surveillance—form, not sub-
stance. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). Rejecting the observation that equivalent information 
might have been obtained through unenhanced surveillance, the Court in Kyllo de-
termined that the technologically enhanced search was substantively different and 
thus warranted different constitutional treatment. Id. at 35 n.2 (“The fact that equiva-
lent information could sometimes be obtained by other means does not make lawful 
the use of means that violate the Fourth Amendment.”). Four justices, however, re-
jected this conclusion. Comparing the information revealed by a thermal imager to 
information apparent to any passerby, the dissenters found the use of the imager a 
change in investigative form only—and thus not entitled to novel constitutional 
treatment. Id. at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, the ordinary use of the senses 
might enable a neighbor or passerby to notice the heat emanating from a building, 
particularly if it is vented, as was the case here. Additionally, any member of the 
public might notice that one part of a house is warmer than another part or a nearby 
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Court’s view, mere changes in the form of surveillance did not justi-
fy novel constitutional treatments. Indeed, the Court has oft repeat-
ed the refrain that the Fourth Amendment is not an impediment to 
improved police efficiency.53 Particularly, the Court approved the 
warrantless use of beeper location tracking devices because, in the 
Court’s view, a human tail could obtain similar information. Ap-
proving the use of such a device in Knotts, the Court commented: 
The fact that the officers in this case relied not only on visu-
al surveillance, but on the use of the beeper to signal the 
presence of [co-defendant] Petschen’s automobile to the po-
lice receiver, does not alter the situation. Nothing in the 
Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting 
the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with 
such enhancement as science and technology afforded them 
in this case.54 
However, as mosaic theorists have pointed out (and as the 
Court has at times acknowledged), the above approach is too sim-
plistic; it depends, in part, on the false assumption that no greater 
invasion of privacy is occasioned by technologically enhanced sur-
veillance. But as technology increases our ability to store, compare, 
and continuously obtain new data streams from multiple targets, 
there is growing recognition of the fact that, in some instances, 
technological advances do more than simply make police work 
more efficient; sometimes those advances radically change the sub-
stance of the investigation. Such a difference in kind (not just de-
gree), the argument goes, warrants different constitutional treat-
                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
building if, for example, rainwater evaporates or snow melts at different rates across 
its surfaces.”). 
53 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284 (“We have never equated police efficiency with unconsti-
tutionality, and we decline to do so now.”). 
54 Id. at 281. 
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ment. The challenges, though, are twofold. First, we must objective-
ly confirm that it is possible, as an absolute matter, for a difference 
in kind to come to pass. Second, we must identify the point at 
which that change occurs. As is discussed in greater detail in the 
sections below, the science provides a clear answer to the first que-
ry–machine learning can demonstrate objectively that the collection 
of numerous data points will eventually tell the observer more than 
the sum of the data collected. Moreover, while a clear answer to the 
second question depends on the details of the investigation, we are 
in principle able to provide such. 
As a legal matter, critics of the mosaic theory have identified 
the above as the two most persuasive challenges facing the theory. 
Justice Scalia noted this in his majority opinion in Jones, comment-
ing, “it remains unexplained why a 4-week investigation is ‘surely’ 
too long.”55 Legal academics have echoed a similar grievance in 
their writing.56 Thus, in addition to the lessons that can be learned 
on the scientific front, we should also begin thinking how we might 
anchor those lessons in the existing legal landscape. In this regard, 
it should be noted that the scientific advances, which we describe in 
the sections to follow,57 are still in development. Accordingly, until 
we are able to answer with greater objectivity the precise moment at 
which a change occurs, the applicable legal rules will necessarily be 
something less than fully developed. In this sense we now turn to 
consider whether what machine learning currently makes possible 
can be squared with aspects of existing Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. We suggest that the minimal constitutional protection histori-
cally afforded to particular types of information and the Court’s 
past willingness to adopt mathematically bright lines in connection 
                                                          
 
 
 
55 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012). 
56 See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 2, at 311. 
57 See infra Sections II, III. 
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with other legal concepts are anchoring points around which future 
courts can begin to structure their thinking as they seek to identify 
the threshold at which enough is enough–the point at which long-
term government surveillance becomes objectively unreasonable.  
D. THE PRIVACY OF THE HOME AS A BASIS FOR LOCATION TRACKING. 
Interestingly, with the current state of the science, the most rel-
evant strand of precedent comes not from the Court’s past adjudica-
tion of tracking devices; but rather from the Court’s treatment of 
information about the home. Without question, while no place is 
afforded unqualified “status” protection under the Fourth Amend-
ment,58 the Court has consistently said that the home will be afford-
ed the greatest protection possible.59 Thus, in New York v. Payton, 
the Court acknowledged that “physical entry of the home is the 
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is 
directed.”60 In contrast, in Oliver v. United States, the Court declined 
to protect an “open field” behind Oliver’s home because “open 
fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the 
Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or 
surveillance.”61 
Moving one rung up the ladder of abstraction, the Court in pro-
tecting the home has articulated a standard that encompasses not 
only the physical space, but also details about the activities occur-
                                                          
 
 
 
58 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-78 (observing that “[n]o single factor 
determines whether an individual legitimately may claim under the Fourth 
Amendment that a place should be free of government intrusion not authorized by 
warrant.”) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152-153 (1978) (Powell, J., concur-
ring)). 
59 See, e.g., United States v. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
60 445 U.S. 573, 585-86 (1980) (citing United States v. United States District Court, 
407 U.S. 297); see also id. at 601 (noting “the sanctity of the home that has been em-
bedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.”). 
61 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179. 
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ring therein. Notably, in Kyllo v. United States,62 federal agents chose 
to investigate a suspected marijuana grower by scanning his home 
one evening with a thermal imaging device that revealed areas of 
relative heat. There was no physical intrusion into the suspect’s 
house. Instead, officers were able to observe remotely an area of 
extreme heat over the garage, which they believed to be consistent 
with use of the high intensity halide lamps needed to grow mariju-
ana indoors. Following conviction, Kyllo challenged the warrantless 
use of the imager. Starting from the premise that the warrantless 
search of a home is, with few exceptions, unconstitutional, the 
Court found that use of the imager was unlawful because the in-
formation it obtained could not otherwise have been gathered 
without physical trespass into the home’s interior.63 
In the now often-repeated quote from the Kyllo decision, the 
Court declared warrantless use of the thermal imager unconstitu-
tional where the device might “disclose, for example, at what hour 
each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath.”64 
Declaring details that are traditionally associated with the intima-
cies of home life protected, the Court held that the warrantless scan 
of Kyllo’s home violated the Fourth Amendment. Without question, 
the Kyllo Court was unwilling to present a laundry list of “intimate 
details” that it considered worthy of protection. Rather, the Court 
noted, in the context of the home all details are intimate whether 
those details be the color of the rug in the front hallway or the tim-
                                                          
 
 
 
62 United States v. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
63 Id. at 34-35; see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (striking down the 
warrantless use of an electronic device tracking the location of a can of ether in a 
private residence because “had a [Drug Enforcement Administration] agent thought 
it useful to enter the . . . residence to verify that the ether was actually in the house 
and had he done so surreptitiously and without a warrant, there is little doubt that 
he would have engaged in an unreasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.”). 
64 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38. 
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ing of the resident’s evening soak. In the Court’s view, “obtaining 
by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the inte-
rior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained with-
out physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’ con-
stitutes a search.”65 
In Florida v. Jardines, the Court again affirmed that for purposes 
of Fourth Amendment protection the “home is first among 
equals.”66 In that case, police suspected that Jardines was growing 
marijuana in his home. Officers set up surveillance at the residence 
and determined that Jardines was not home. The officers then sent a 
drug-sniffing dog and his trainer onto the porch of the house to see 
if the dog would alert. After several minutes the dog did in fact 
alert by sitting down at the front door to indicate that it was the 
source of the strongest odor. The officers left and obtained a war-
rant based, in part, upon the drug dog’s alert at the home’s front 
door. A subsequent search of the house revealed a marijuana grow-
ing operation. Jardines challenged the validity of the warrant. He 
argued that the dog sniff on the front porch constituted a warrant-
less search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The 
Court agreed. Of particular relevance to the discussion here, the 
Court noted that at the very core of Fourth Amendment protection 
is the right of persons to retreat into their homes free of unwanted 
government scrutiny. “This right would be of little practical value if 
the State’s agents could stand in a home’s porch or side garden and 
trawl for evidence with impunity.”67 
For purposes of the present conversation, there would be little 
gained from the Court’s historic protection of the home if that pro-
tection were motivated solely by concern for the physical space. 
                                                          
 
 
 
65 Id. at 34 (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)). 
66 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013). 
67 Id. 
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However, as the Court’s decisions make clear, the Fourth Amend-
ment sanctity of the home is about something much broader. De-
scribing the rationale underlying constitutional protection of the 
intimate activities of the home, the Court has explained that some 
refuge from public scrutiny is necessary to the concept of ordered 
liberty: 
A man can still control a small part of his environment, his 
house; he can retreat thence from outsiders, secure in the 
knowledge that they cannot get at him without disobeying 
the Constitution. That is still a sizable hunk of liberty—
worth protecting from encroachment. A sane, decent, civi-
lized society must provide some such oasis, some shelter 
from public scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some en-
clave, some inviolate place which is a man’s castle.68 
Echoing a similar understanding of the principles underlying 
the Fourth Amendment’s protection of the home, Justice Kagan in 
her concurrence in Jardines described the police conduct there as 
objectionable not simply because of the intrusion into a private 
physical space, but because that intrusion was used to “nos[e] into 
intimacies you sensibly thought protected from disclosure.”69 Stat-
ing plainly the broader principles inspiring the home’s protection, 
Justice Kagan wrote, “And so the sentiment ‘my home is my own,’ 
while originating in property law, now also denotes a common un-
derstanding—extending even beyond that law’s formal protec-
tions—about an especially private sphere. Jardines’s home was his 
property; it was also his most intimate and familiar space.”70 
                                                          
 
 
 
68 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 n.4 (1961) (emphasis added) (citing 
United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 315-16 (C.A.2) (Frank, J., dissenting)). 
69 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring).  
70 Id. at 1419. 
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Without question, these cases do not provide a completely satis-
factory answer. To be meaningful, the protection offered by the mo-
saic theory will need to do more than offer the protection already 
provided. However, we contend simply that the principles under-
girding the home’s constitutional protection are a starting point. 
They provide some guidance in thinking about when, at a bare min-
imum, discrete units of location data will combine to form a mosaic 
worthy of constitutional protection. In other words, machine learn-
ing provides a useful anchor by telling us objectively that aggrega-
tion of location tracking data will at point   begin to reveal infor-
mation akin to that which has already received the protection just 
discussed. 
In thinking about how existing legal standards might inform a 
mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment protection, another piece of 
the puzzle is provided by the Court’s refusal to protect information 
about the home where, in the Court’s view, that information was 
held out to public scrutiny. The Court’s treatment of information 
held out for public scrutiny helps inform our thinking about where 
we might defensibly place an outer limit. For example, in California 
v. Greenwood the Court determined that the police could, without a 
warrant, search sealed trash bags left at the curb for collection.71 
Certainly the information in Greenwood’s trash told the police 
something about what was going on in Greenwood’s home. But, 
explaining the holding, Justice White, stated that, “respondents ex-
posed their garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat their claim to 
Fourth Amendment protection.” 72  In the Court’s view, while 
Greenwood may not have wanted the police to go through his gar-
bage, that expectation was not one that society recognized as rea-
sonable. Because wild animals and mischievous children might rifle 
                                                          
 
 
 
71 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).  
72 Id. at 40. 
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through trash bags at the curb, the Court reasoned a homeowner 
should not expect the police to abstain from similar conduct. 
Just one year later, in Florida v. Riley, the Court authorized war-
rantless police efforts to obtain information by flying low over Ri-
ley’s five-acre property in a helicopter.73 Riley had a mobile home 
and a greenhouse on the property. Two walls of the greenhouse 
were enclosed. The other two sides of the greenhouse were com-
pletely obscured from ground views by the mobile home, bushes, 
and a surrounding forest. The greenhouse and home were enclosed 
by a fence, which was posted with a “Do Not Enter” sign. The top 
of the greenhouse was almost entirely covered with translucent 
roofing panels. However, from the low altitude used to fly over the 
property, the police were able to observe, through a space left open 
by two missing roof panels, the marijuana plants that Riley grew 
inside. Asked to rule on the constitutionality of the fly-over, the 
Court held that any expectation of privacy that Riley may have had 
was unreasonable—“[b]ecause the sides and roof of his greenhouse 
were left partially open . . . what was growing in the greenhouse 
was subject to viewing from the air.”74  
The Court’s decisions in Riley, Kyllo, Jardines, and Greenwood 
cannot, with the existing state of the science, provide “the” answer. 
But, they are “data points” in the Fourth Amendment landscape 
that provide several interesting insights. First, we can say that the 
privacy protection afforded to “home life” cannot be said to rise or 
fall with physical boundaries. In Jardines, the Court found a privacy 
violation upon physical entry onto the suspect’s porch, while Kyllo 
found a similar violation with no such physical intrusion. In Green-
wood, trash bags left outside the home were not protected; and in 
Riley, a similar conclusion was reached, even though the govern-
                                                          
 
 
 
73 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989). 
74 Id. at 450. 
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ment peeked into a home’s backyard. Put simply, the Court’s deci-
sions reflect its move from a notion of home privacy that is depend-
ent on physical space to a much more flexible interpretation of what 
constitutes “home life.” Further, the manner in which the Court has 
drawn a line between protected “intimate details” and unprotected 
“public information” can help us think about where a line of mini-
mal constitutional protection in the realm of location tracking might 
lie. When considering whether the mosaic theory is viable as an ab-
straction, one obvious question is why location tracking data should 
be compared with the intimate details of the home that were pro-
tected in Jardines and Kyllo, and not with the information held out to 
public scrutiny in Greenwood and Riley. Machine learning provides 
the beginning contours of an answer. 
As described in greater detail below,75 one thing we know for 
certain is, when aided by machine learning, discrete points of loca-
tion data reveal far more about a target in the aggregate than simp-
ly a chronicle of where the target has been. Viewing that technolog-
ical reality through the lens of precedent provides one possible an-
swer to the criticism of the mosaic theory as being impossibly im-
precise. If the science tells us that the collection of x data points en-
ables disclosure of information “that could not otherwise have been 
obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protect-
ed area,’” then a plausible argument exists that the law should, at a 
bare minimum, recognize a constitutionally significant search under 
the mosaic theory at the moment at which x data points are collect-
ed.76 Put somewhat more plainly, it could be said as a starting point, 
we can understand a mosaic worthy of constitutional protection as 
being established when the collection of location tracking data ena-
                                                          
 
 
 
75 Infra Section IV. 
76 Certainly, if the collection of any individual data point constitutes a discrete 
search under existing case law, it could be as such analyzed without resort to the 
mosaic theory. 
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bles the police to learn intimate details about a target’s home life 
that could not otherwise be learned without intrusion into the tar-
get’s private realm. To be certain, this is just a minimal starting 
point in thinking about where the appropriate layer of constitution-
al protection must lie, for it goes without saying that the Constitu-
tion protects reasonable expectations of privacy well beyond the 
four walls of the abode. 
E. QUANTIFYING THE MOSAIC 
As the above demonstrates, the abstract notion of the mosaic 
theory can be preliminarily aligned with privacy notions that have 
previously been articulated in the case law. However, without fur-
ther development of the science it will be difficult to objectively ar-
ticulate the precise contours of the theory. Thus, even if it can be 
said that the minimum level of constitutional protection is tripped 
when location data enables the discovery of the type of information 
that already enjoys constitutional protection, the question of line 
drawing remains. In this section, we explore this line drawing and 
whether there is any support in the precedent for precise quantifica-
tion of legal concepts. Efforts to imbue inexact legal concepts with 
some aspects of numeric measurement are not unique to privacy. In 
other areas of the law, similar suggestions have been made to trans-
late relatively amorphous notions into more certain mathematical 
models.77 The Court, though, has most often declined to endorse a 
precise mathematical formulation.78 
                                                          
 
 
 
77 See e.g., Ronald J. Bacigal, Making the Right Gamble: The Odds on Probable Cause, 
74 MISS. L.J. 279 (2004); Edward K. Cheng, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 
YALE L.J. 1254 (2013); Michael O. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, A Bayesian Ap-
proach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1970); Erica Goldberg, Getting 
Beyond Intuition in the Probable Cause Inquiry, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1065; John 
Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1968); 
C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitu-
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In Maryland v. Pringle, for example, the Court noted that “the 
probable-cause standard is a ‘practical, nontechnical conception’ 
that deals with ‘the factual and practical considerations of everyday 
life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, 
act.’”79 Under the facts of that case, a police officer stopped a car for 
speeding, and, after searching it, found cocaine, of which all three 
passengers in the car denied ownership.80 Absent any other facts, 
each passenger, as a mathematical proposition, was likely to have 
committed a narcotics offense with a probability of only one-third. 
Nonetheless, the Court found that the officer had probable cause to 
arrest the respondent Pringle, one of the three passengers.81 Though 
some argued that the Court’s decision signaled a new mathematical 
understanding of probable cause, i.e., 33⅓%, the Court made clear it 
was not adopting a precise quantitative definition of the term: 
“[t]he probable cause standard is incapable of precise definition or 
quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities 
and depends on the totality of the circumstances.” On the totality 
                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
tional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293 (1982); Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, 
Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 123 (1980-1981); Barbara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Be-
havior with Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408 (1979). 
But see, e.g., J. D. Jackson, Probability and Mathematics in Court Fact-Finding, 31 N. IR. 
LEGAL Q. 239 (1980); Orin Kerr, Why Courts Should not Quantify Probable Cause, THE 
POLITICAL HEART OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 131 (Michael Klarman et al. eds., 2012); 
Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 
HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971). 
78 See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983) (stating that “an effort to fix 
some general, numerically precise degree of certainty corresponding to ‘probable 
cause’ may not be helpful”). But see, e.g., United States v. Schipani, 289 F. Supp. 43, 
55-56 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (stating that the proof of a fact by preponderance of evidence 
requires a probability of at least 50%). 
79 Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 231 (1983)); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983) (quoting Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). 
80 Pringle, 540 U.S. at 368. 
81 See id. at 374. 
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before it, the Pringle Court found that “[t]he quantity of drugs and 
cash in the car indicated the likelihood of drug dealing, [to be] an 
enterprise [among the three passengers] to which a dealer would be 
unlikely to admit an innocent person with the potential to furnish 
evidence against him.”82 
The Court’s reluctance to quantify other legal standards can be 
seen in its treatment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and pre-
ponderance of the evidence. Noting the usefulness of these stand-
ards despite their inability to be quantified, Justice Harlan stated in 
his concurring opinion in In re Winship that “[a]lthough the phrases 
‘preponderance of the evidence’ and ‘proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt’ are quantitatively imprecise, they do communicate to the 
finder of fact different notions concerning the degree of confidence 
he is expected to have in the correctness of his factual conclu-
sions.”83 
Notwithstanding the above, however, it would be inaccurate to 
suggest that the Court always eschews the comparative certainty 
that comes with mathematically precise bright lines. Accordingly, 
the Court’s refusal to adopt a quantitative understanding of a term 
like probable cause does not stand in the way of the instant sugges-
tion that a more precise understanding of the mosaic theory can 
(and should) be informed by the developing objective scientific no-
tions. Though the Court’s present reluctance to embrace the mosaic 
theory appears to be driven in part by reluctance to draw an arbi-
trary constitutional line in the field of location tracking, it has not 
                                                          
 
 
 
82 Id. at 373 (emphasis added); Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1055 (2013) (not-
ing that the “test for probable cause is not reducible to ‘precise definition or quantifi-
cation.’”); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (“Articulating precisely what 
‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘probable cause’ mean is not possible.”). 
83 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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been so reserved universally.84 In certain contexts, the Court has 
embraced numerical approaches to rule-making, even while admit-
ting that the precise point selected was somewhat arbitrary. 
For example, the Court has determined that a custodial sus-
pect’s request for counsel will not bar further uncounseled ques-
tioning, so long as the suspect has experienced a fourteen-day 
“break” in custody.85 In that case, Maryland v. Shatzer, Shatzer, an 
inmate at a Maryland prison, was questioned about the sexual 
abuse of his son. After being given Miranda warnings, Shatzer indi-
cated that he wanted to speak with an attorney. The questioning 
detective left, and Shatzer was returned to the general prison popu-
lation. Three years later, a second detective visited Shatzer, gave 
him Miranda warnings, and questioned him again about the abuse. 
During this second round of questioning, Shatzer made incriminat-
ing statements. Finding that the statements were not obtained in 
violation of Shatzer’s rights, the Supreme Court held that “once the 
suspect has been out of custody long enough (14 days) to eliminate 
the coercive effect, there will be nothing to gain” by continuing to 
recognize a prohibition on future questioning.86 Writing in concur-
rence, Justice Stevens noted, “Today’s decision . . . offers no reason 
for its 14-day time period. To be sure, it may be difficult to marshal 
conclusive evidence when setting an arbitrary time period.”87 
Another instance in which the Court has been willing to quanti-
fy constitutional protection to advance a simple rule is with regard 
                                                          
 
 
 
84 With regard to the Fifth Amendment, the Court has readily acknowledged that 
lines it has drawn are arbitrary but bright. The Court’s refusal to quantify legal con-
cepts like reasonable doubt and probable cause is driven less by a concern for arbi-
trariness, and more by an appreciation for the complex mental processes underlying 
such evaluations. In the Court’s view quantification in such instances would do more 
harm than good.  
85 See Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010). 
86 Id. at 1223.  
87 Id. at 1231 n.7 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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to binary searches (searches that can produce only two results). The 
Court has clearly said that binary searches at both the high and low 
ends of the technological scale are permissible without a warrant 
because of the limited quantity of data they reveal, assuming they 
do not tread upon other constitutional protections.88  
Though the Court in some cases has been unwilling to quantify 
legal concepts, in others it has found that hard numbers aid in the 
articulation of legal standards. Most importantly, with regard to 
location tracking, the Court has previously found that the quantity 
of information collected may be relevant to the intrusiveness of the 
government’s conduct, and thus would be relevant to the appropri-
ate level of constitutional protection afforded.89 Thus, the sugges-
tion that practical implementation of the mosaic theory will benefit 
from a more quantitative understanding of objective reasonableness 
is not contrary to existing doctrine. 
The urge to quantify the Fourth Amendment’s protection in the 
context of location tracking is, in part, a call for greater objectivity 
and, in part, a call for greater protection. As the unanimous decision 
in Jones reflects, however, the Court is not quite ready to make the 
leap. The Court’s reluctance to fully embrace the mosaic theory in 
this context is not unwarranted. While the concerns of the concur-
ring justices in Jones are readily understood at a visceral level, they 
are more difficult to defend objectively. And while the Court has, at 
times, been willing to embrace arbitrary numerical standards, a 
stronger case for change is made if one can explain why it would 
improve the status quo. As Justice Scalia wryly explained in the ma-
jority opinion language quoted above,90 the quantification of objec-
                                                          
 
 
 
88 Compare Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408-09 (2005); United States v. Place, 
462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123-24 (1984) with 
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013). 
89 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983). 
90 Supra Section I.0 
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tive reasonableness advanced by the concurrences is hardly more 
clear-cut than the generic objective reasonableness standard under 
Katz that it seeks to enhance. Indeed, even the concurring justices 
conceded that they could not identify the precise point at which 
monitoring moved from permissible to unconstitutional: “We need 
not identify with precision the point at which the tracking of this 
vehicle became a search, for the line was surely crossed before the 
4-week mark.”91 
However, what the concurring justices in Jones recognized, and 
what the Court’s prior guidance tells us is that it is generally possi-
ble to identify a minimum point at which constitutional protection 
must attach. Put somewhat differently, there is an upper bound for 
a period of time at which technologically-aided location tracking 
stops being simply more efficient surveillance and becomes some-
thing altogether different substantively. The lessons of machine 
learning help us to understand where that upper temporal bound 
lies for they help us to understand exactly what can be learned from 
the aggregation of various types of data. Moreover, those same les-
sons will help us more clearly identify to what extent the upper 
bound can be lowered. If these lessons are taken seriously, the im-
precision decried in Jones will not be a barrier to quantification 
much longer. 
Before turning to a discussion of the power of machine learn-
ing, it should be noted that in constructing the jurisprudence of the 
Fourth Amendment, the Court has expressed concern for both the 
current state of scientific knowledge and its likely future ability.92 A 
scientific understanding of location tracking that will help to make 
future abilities clear would thus do much to advance the discussion. 
                                                          
 
 
 
91 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
92 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001) (“While the technology used in the 
present case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt must take account of more so-
phisticated systems that are already in use or in development.”). 
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The machine learning principles, described in Section II., combined 
with the privacy metrics described in Section III., do just that. They 
provide a rationale for according differential legal treatment to 
technologically enhanced location tracking of different durations.93 
They help explain why location tracking data gathered for x data 
points can be substantively different than location tracking data 
gathered for     data points or     time units. In this sense, ma-
chine learning and privacy metrics provide a dispassionate explana-
tion for the Jones concurrences’ intuitive belief that GPS monitoring 
of a suspect for twenty-eight days is different than the only hours-
long beeper monitoring at issue in Knotts. 
II. MACHINE LEARNING 
As discussed earlier,94 under the mosaic theory, a sequence of 
acts may constitute a Fourth Amendment search even if none of the 
individual acts trigger constitutional scrutiny. This insight is the 
core element of the mosaic theory. It acknowledges that the aggre-
gation of observations about a person can lead to a picture that is 
more revealing than the sum of the individual observations. How-
ever, how is this possible? That is the question to which machine 
learning provides an answer. 
Machine learning is a field that seeks to harness today’s expo-
nential data deluge by finding patterns in it, making predictions 
from it, and efficiently organizing it. Machine learning leverages 
large-scale efficient algorithms from computer science and princi-
pled inference methods from statistics. However, machine learning 
can also be potentially invasive if applied to location data or other 
data: it can deduce information that may otherwise have been pro-
                                                          
 
 
 
93 Related prediction programs are already being used by law enforcement. For 
example, Mosaic 20 is a domestic violence prediction program currently in use. 
94 See supra Section I.0 
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tected by the natural limitations of manual and human-driven in-
vestigation. 
Machine learning works best when given a large training set of 
observations (ideally drawn in some independent manner) with 
which it estimates models. These models are then used to make 
predictions on future data outputting a probability measure for the 
occurrence of an event or existence of a fact. The train/test para-
digm can largely be automated and also reliably evaluated. Three 
natural regimes can be distinguished: unsupervised machine learn-
ing, supervised machine learning, and semi-supervised machine 
learning. Each will be discussed in turn. We caution that this is a 
very brief overview of a highly mathematical branch of computer 
science. 
 
A. UNSUPERVISED MACHINE LEARNING 
In unsupervised machine learning, a dataset describing   peo-
ple is measured and stored as {       }. Here, each    refers to all 
the data collected about user   (the profile or location history or 
some other collection of personal information).95 A machine learn-
ing system automatically finds dependencies, correlations, and clus-
ters in the data without requiring any significant human interven-
tion. More specifically, it could perform the following operations: 
                                                          
 
 
 
95 Unsupervised machine learning is an umbrella term that covers many aspects of 
density estimation, Bayesian inference, and maximum likelihood. Bayesian inference 
dates back to Reverend Thomas Bayes, FRS (1702-61) with a general overview by 
GEORGE E.P. BOX & GEORGE C. TIAO, BAYESIAN INFERENCE IN STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
VOL. 40 (John Wiley & Sons 2011). More recent Bayesian inference approaches in-
volve large sets of interdependent random variables as described by DAVID 
HECKERMAN, A TUTORIAL ON LEARNING WITH BAYESIAN NETWORKS (Springer 2008). 
Maximum likelihood was formalized by R.A. Fisher at the start of the 20th century as 
discussed by John Aldrich, R.A. Fisher and the making of maximum likelihood 1912-1922, 
STATISTICAL SCIENCE 12.3, 162-76 (1997).  
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 Clustering: In clustering, a system automatically finds 
groups of users in the dataset that appear statistically simi-
lar. For instance, certain individuals may show a pattern of 
visiting churches on Sundays while others stay home dur-
ing that time. After application of a clustering algorithm, it 
becomes relatively easy for a human investigator to ob-
serve prototypes from each cluster and figure out which 
group it represents (for instance, followers of a particular 
faith, e.g., Christians). The number of groups to be extract-
ed can be fixed (i.e., find the 5 most important groups) or 
can be automatically estimated. The groupings could be 
disjoint, overlapping, hierarchical, or nested in various 
ways. For instance, sub-groups of religious activity (Bap-
tists, Roman-Catholics, Lutherans, etc.) could emerge un-
der a larger umbrella group (Christians). 
 
 Detection: Given data about individuals as an unbiased 
sample of the population, a detection system recovers a 
probability distribution,     , which says how an individ-
ual likely behaves under this sample. This permits an in-
vestigator to flag anomalous users in the training data (and 
in future data) as individuals with a      score that is low-
er than some reasonable threshold. Alternatively, it is pos-
sible to identify the handful of users who had the lowest 
     scores as outliers, for example, in a location dataset 
those who do not exhibit regular location movement. One 
natural example of an outlier is the mail carrier who 
spends the workday going door-to-door delivering mail. 
This is an unusual commute pattern relative to the rest of 
the population. 
 
 Visualization and Summarization: Another application of 
machine learning is visualizing trends in “big data” and 
highlighting important aspects in it. While each person’s 
record,   , may contain thousands or millions of bytes of 
information, a human investigator can only visualize pro-
jections of the data in two or three dimensions. Machine 
learning, however, finds low-dimensional embeddings, 
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which summarize the original data with minimal distor-
tion. For example, the similarities or distances between 
pairs of visualized low-dimensional embedding-points 
could be almost equal to the similarities or distances that 
were measured between pairs of original data points. Al-
ternatively, only the key measurements in the original data 
points are preserved. For example, from the thousands of 
latitude and longitude coordinates a user visited that are 
stored in   , it is possible to extract one or two important 
locations such as the user’s home or place of work. 
 
 Inference: One of the most powerful unsupervised ma-
chine learning techniques is arguably probabilistic inference. 
In particular, machine learning is able to find dependencies 
in parts of a collection of data gathered about users. For in-
stance, if we have observed two types of information for 
many users, say, their location history and web-browsing 
history, a machine learning system can learn the depend-
ence and correlations between locations and browsing. 
This allows the system, for example, to fill-in likely brows-
ing patterns for a new user even though only location his-
tory for this user was available. Put another way, we can 
predict a user will probably visit the website espn.com fre-
quently if that user has frequently attended sports events at 
stadiums. 
B. SUPERVISED MACHINE LEARNING 
In supervised machine learning, a dataset of   input and target 
output pairs, {                 } , is measured. 96  Here, each    
could, for example, refer to a profile, aggregation of location infor-
                                                          
 
 
 
96 Currently popular methods that embody supervised machine learning are de-
scribed in CARL EDWARD RASMUSSEN & CHRISTOPHER K.I. WILLIAMS, GAUSSIAN 
PROCESSES FOR MACHINE LEARNING (MIT Press 2006). 
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mation, or other collection of data about a user while    is a label 
with which this data has been manually annotated. For instance,    
could refer to the fact that the individual is on a suspicious list. This 
type of data is more laborious to create since it requires human an-
notation effort while unsupervised learning is more of a pure data 
collection exercise. With supervised learning, we can perform the 
following operations with varying degrees of accuracy: 
 
 Classification: One of the most basic supervised machine 
learning operations is classification, that is, the identification 
of a category for a new observation. In addition to collect-
ing data,    , about an individual, classification also re-
quires that we annotate individuals with a discrete label, 
  . Collecting such a categorical variable,    , about an indi-
vidual often requires some effort, expense, or a need for the 
subject to volunteer information about themselves. For ex-
ample, in addition to collecting location data, one may sur-
vey a small portion of the population and ask them to re-
port their occupation (student, construction worker, taxi 
driver, etc). Then, having obtained such labels from the 
survey, it is possible for a machine learning system to au-
tomatically label other individuals using only their location 
data,   . 
 
 Regression: While classification involves obtaining a dis-
crete label,   , for an individual, regression assumes that the 
discrete label is a scalar. For instance, instead of a category 
(such as occupation), we may collect the income that the 
individual received last year as a numerical value. Machine 
learning then learns a good prediction function from train-
ing examples to accurately estimate the salary,    of other 
individuals directly from their location data. For instance, 
by getting location data from someone who lives in an ex-
pensive neighborhood and works in the financial district, it 
would be possible to estimate a high income level,   . 
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 Prediction: In prediction, the output,   , is either discrete (as 
in classification) or continuous (as in regression), but is also 
specifically a quantity that is only available in the future af-
ter the input raw data,   , is observed from a user. For ex-
ample,    may be the location (latitude and longitude) that 
the user will visit tomorrow for lunch. Alternatively,    
may be the party (Republican or Democrat) that a person 
will vote for in the next election. By observing a population 
of users for some time, it may be possible to predict that 
user   will likely go for pizza at the mall in his or her next 
lunch break. Prediction may help an advertising company 
determine what ad to target on a mobile device by deliver-
ing a relevant message (for instance, to lure the user to a 
new pizza establishment in the vicinity of his or her next 
lunch location). 
 
While some of these supervised learning problems are difficult, 
with increasing amounts of data, the accuracy of the classification, 
regression, or prediction improves and eventually achieves surpris-
ingly strong performance. Unfortunately, collecting labels in addi-
tion to raw data may be an expensive proposition. This leads to a 
third regime which attempts to leverage large amounts of cheap 
unsupervised raw data with small amounts of expensive labels to 
obtain the best of both worlds. 
C. SEMI-SUPERVISED AND NETWORK LEARNING 
Semi-supervised learning has recently emerged. 97  It can be 
thought of as the natural blend of both supervised and unsuper-
vised methods. As in supervised learning, on some individuals, we 
                                                          
 
 
 
97 Xiaojin Zhu, Zoubin Ghahramani & John Lafferty, Semi-Supervised Learning Us-
ing Gaussian Fields and Harmonic Functions, THE INT’L CONF. ON MACHINE LEARNING, 
912-19 (2003). See generally OLIVIER CHAPELLE, BERNHARD SCHÖLKOPF & ALEXANDER 
ZIEN, SEMI-SUPERVISED LEARNING (MIT Press 2006). 
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have raw input data as well as a target variable. However, on the 
vast majority of other individuals, we only have raw input data 
(say, just location data) without any human label annotation. A ma-
jor component of semi-supervised learning is learning with network 
data, which has potentially the largest implications for private and 
location data. 
As social networks and social media proliferate, network data is 
quickly becoming another important alternative to the training da-
tasets mentioned earlier. Rather than having profile information 
about   individuals in the form of {       }, it is increasingly pop-
ular to gather information about interactions between pairs of   
individuals represented by potentially          edges between 
them in the form {                       }. Each edge,     , between 
two individuals,   and  , represents a relationship, such as a friend-
ship or work relationship. 
Such networks can be inferred from mobile communication and 
location data. For instance, people who call each other can be as-
sumed to be friends and this leads to the formation of a friendship 
edge between a pair of users. Alternatively, people who spend 
much time together in similar locations (i.e., co-locate), would also 
allow an algorithm to infer the presence of an edge or relationship 
between those two individuals. Moreover, network datasets are 
natural targets for semi-supervised learning. By knowing some la-
bels on a few individuals in a network (such as their shopping pref-
erences), it is possible to propagate or diffuse this label information 
to predict labels for others nearby in their network (such as their 
friends and the friends of their friends).98 
                                                          
 
 
 
98 The theoretical framework behind such network labeling is explicated in Xiaojin 
Zhu, Semi-Supervised Learning with Graphs (May 2005) (Ph.D. thesis, Carnegie Mellon 
University). 
 New York University Journal of Law & Liberty   [Vol. 8:555 
 
 
 
596 
 
III. PRIVACY METRICS 
Machine learning provides a basis for the mosaic theory’s ra-
tionale that aggregate information can reveal more than the sum of 
individual observations. It does not, however, provide a measure 
for privacy. Furthermore, the legal guidance tells us what sort of 
information and which realms of life have been traditionally pro-
tected, but affords little help for deciding when collected data has 
tripped that threshold. 
However, the quantification of privacy is the subject of various 
privacy metrics proposed in the computer science literature. While 
most of these metrics are developed for measuring privacy in data-
bases, they are also used for anonymization in location-based web 
services and for other location privacy purposes. This section will 
discuss two of those metrics: k-anonymity and l-diversity.99 Their 
underlying notions can be applied to the output of a machine learn-
                                                          
 
 
 
99 k-anonymity was the starting point for a whole family of privacy metrics that 
built upon and extended it: for l-diversity see Ashwin Machanavajjhala, Daniel Kifer, 
Johannes Gehrke & Muthuramakrishnan Venkitasubramaniam, l-diversity: Privacy 
Beyond k-anonymity, 1 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY FROM DATA 1 
(2007); for t-closeness see Ninghui Li, Tiancheng Li & Suresh Venkatasubramanian, t-
closeness: Privacy beyond k-anonymity and l-diversity, INT’L CONF. ON DATA ENG’G, 106 
(2007) [hereinafter ICDE]; for m-invariance see Xiaokui Xiao and Yufei Tao, m-
invariance: Towards Privacy Preserving Re-publication of Dynamic Datasets, SPECIAL INT. 
GRP. ON MGMT. OF DATA, 689 (2007) [hereinafter SIGMOD]; for δ-presence see M. 
Ercan Nergiz, Maurizio Atzori & Christopher W. Clifton, Hiding the Presence of Indi-
viduals From Shared Databases, PROC. OF THE 2007 ACM SIGMOD ICDE, 665 (2007). 
Beyond k-anonymity and its progeny, one of the most influential recent privacy met-
rics is differential privacy. See Cynthia Dwork, Differential Privacy, 33 INT’L 
COLLOQUIUM ON AUTOMATA, LANGUAGES AND PROGRAMMING, 4052:1 (2006). How-
ever, differential privacy is rarely used for purposes of location privacy. For one of 
the few exceptions see Rinku Dewri, Location Privacy and Attacker Knowledge: Who Are 
We Fighting against?, 7 PROC. INT’L. ICST CONF. ON SEC. AND PRIVACY IN COMMC’N 
NETWORKS (2011). 
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ing algorithm, thereby allowing for integration into Fourth 
Amendment doctrine. 
A. K-ANONYMITY 
Most approaches for quantifying location privacy are based on 
k-anonymity.100 Under the k-anonymity metric, which originated in 
the context of database privacy,101 a release of information from a 
database is k-anonymous “if the information for each person con-
tained in the release cannot be distinguished from at least     in-
dividuals whose information also appears in the release.”102 Apply-
ing this metric to location privacy, a person is k-anonymous if his or 
her location is indistinguishable from the location of at least      
other persons.103 Such anonymity is achieved by spatial cloaking, 
that is, a trusted third party or peer-to-peer process transforms the 
precise location of the person to be anonymized into a larger area, 
known as the anonymity spatial region. This area must be large 
enough to contain the location of all k individuals. For an area of 
                                                          
 
 
 
100  Aris Gkoulalas-Divanis, Panos Kalnis & Vassilios S. Verykios, Providing k-
anonymity in Location Based Services, 12 SPECIAL INT. GRP. IN KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY 
& DATABASES EXPLOR. NEWSL., 3, 5 (2010). See generally Marco Gruteser & Dirk 
Grunwald, Anonymous Usage of Location-Based Services Through Spatial and Temporal 
Cloaking, 1 PROC. INT’L CONF. ON MOBILE SYS., APPLICATIONS, AND SERVICES, 31 
(2003), who developed an early model of k-anonymous location information. For 
further model proposals see, e.g., Roberto J. Bayardo & Rakesh Agrawal, Data Privacy 
through Optimal k-anonymity, 21 PROC. INT’L CONF. ON DATA ENG’G (2005); Bugra 
Gedik & Ling Liu, A Customizable k-Anonymity Model for Protecting Location Privacy, 
INT’L CONF. ON DISTR. COMPUTER SYS. 1 (2005) [hereinafter ICDCS]. 
101 Pierangela Samarati & Latanya Sweeney, Protecting Privacy when Disclosing In-
formation: k-anonymity and Its Enforcement through Generalization and Suppression, Tech. 
Report SRI-CSL-98-04, SRI INT’L COMPUTER SCIENCE LAB. (1998). 
102 Latanya Sweeney, k-anonymity: A Model for Protecting Privacy, 10(5) INT. J. OF 
UNCERTAINTY, FUZZINESS AND KNOWLEDGE-BASED SYS. 557, 557 (2002). 
103 Bhuvan Bamba, Ling Liu, Peter Pesti & Ting Wang, Supporting Anonymous Loca-
tion Queries in Mobile Environments with Privacygrid, PROC. INT’L WWW CONF. 237, 
237 (2008). 
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such size it is guaranteed that the identity of the person to be anon-
ymized cannot be disclosed with a probability larger than    .104 
There are many different approaches for selecting the     per-
sons for populating the anonymity spatial region. Those approaches 
can be categorized into location k-anonymity, historical k-
anonymity, and trajectory k-anonymity. 105  Location k-anonymity 
protects a person’s privacy in a network by building the anonymity 
spatial region from the current location of all people in the net-
work. 106  This approach is different from historical k-anonymity, 
which uses the location history as a basis for anonymization.107 His-
torical k-anonymity can be analogized with using people’s foot-
prints instead of their current location. 108  Finally, trajectory k-
anonymity makes use of the location paths of individuals and is 
therefore particularly useful for preserving privacy in location-
based services that cannot be offered in a single communication, 
such as car navigation.109 
Given that the degree of anonymity depends on the choice of k, 
which value should k have? In order to provide some flexibility, 
many k-anonymity approaches do not provide a fixed value, but 
                                                          
 
 
 
104  Aris Gkoulalas-Divanis, Panos Kalnis & Vassilios S. Verykios, Providing k-
anonymity in Location Based Services, 12 SIGKDD EXPLOR. NEWSL. 3, 5 (2010). 
105 Id. 
106 Id. See, e.g., Marco Gruteser & Dirk Grunwald, Anonymous Usage of Location-
based Services Through Spatial and Temporal Cloaking, 1 PROC. INT’L CONF. ON MOBILE 
SYS., APPLICATIONS, AND SERVICES, 31 (2003). 
107  Aris Gkoulalas-Divanis, Panos Kalnis & Vassilios S. Verykios, Providing k-
anonymity in Location Based Services, 12 SIGKDD EXPLOR. NEWSL., 3, 7 (2010). See, e.g., 
Claudio Bettini, X. Sean Wang & Sushil Jajodia, Protecting Privacy Against Location-
based Personal Identification, 2 PROC. VLDB WORKSHOP ON SECURE DATA MGMT., 185 
(2005). 
108  Aris Gkoulalas-Divanis, Panos Kalnis & Vassilios S. Verykios, Providing k-
anonymity in Location Based Services, 12 SIGKDD EXPLOR. NEWSL. 3, 7 (2010). 
109 Id. at 8. See, e.g., Chi-Yin Chow & Mohamed F. Mokbel, Enabling Private Contin-
uous Queries for Revealed User Locations, 10 PROC. INT’L SYMPOSIUM ON ADVANCES IN 
SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL DATABASES 258 (2007). 
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rather allow for an adaptive solution, which is useful because not 
everybody has the same privacy expectations. 110  Furthermore, a 
person may have different privacy expectations at different loca-
tions. Therefore, the same value of k for every person or for one per-
son at every place is not a good fit.111 However, an individual’s abil-
ity to choose the value of k requires sufficient knowledge about the 
number of people in a particular area at a given time.112 Otherwise, 
a system may be unable to accumulate k persons at the time of re-
questing a service, which could render time-critical services inoper-
able. 113  For example, a GPS car navigation system that uses k-
anonymity to protect the driver’s privacy will not work in remote 
areas when there are not enough other cars. 
B. L-DIVERSITY 
Another privacy metric employed in the context of location pri-
vacy is l-diversity. Similar to k-anonymity, l-diversity was originally 
proposed to protect the identity of individuals in databases.114 It is 
founded on the observation that while k-anonymity prevents the 
disclosure of identities, it does not prevent the disclosure of sensi-
tive attributes, such as height, eye color, ethnicity, or other quasi-
identifiers of a person.115 Against this background, l-diversity re-
quires that there are at least l values for each sensitive attribute. 
                                                          
 
 
 
110 See, e.g., Chin-Yin Chow, Mohamed F. Mokbel & Xuan Liu, A Peer-to-Peer Spa-
tial Cloaking Algorithm for Anonymous Location-based Services, ACM INT’L SYMPOSIUM 
ON ADVANCES IN GEOGRAPHIC INFO. SYST. 171, 172 (2006). 
111 See Sheikh Iqbal Ahamed, Md., Munirul Haque & Chowdhury Sharif Hasan, A 
Novel Location Privacy Framework without Trusted Third Party Based on Location Ano-
nymity Prediction, 12 ACM SIGAPP APPLIED COMPUTING REVIEW 24, 25 (2012). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 See generally Ashwin Machanavajjhala, Daniel Kifer, Johannes Gehrke & Mu-
thuramakrishnan Venkitasubramaniam, l-diversity: Privacy Beyond k-anonymity, 1 
ACM TRANSACTIONS ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY FROM DATA 1 (2007). 
115 See id. at 2. 
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More specifically, l-diversity means that “[a] q*-block [that is, a 
block from a database table that contains a generalized quasi-
identifier q*] is l-diverse if it contains at least l well-represented val-
ues for the sensitive attribute S. A table is l-diverse if every q*-block 
is l-diverse.”116 
l-diversity can be utilized as a standalone privacy metric. How-
ever, it can also be seen as a companion measure to be used in tan-
dem with k-anonymity. 117  In the context of location privacy, l-
diversity allows individuals, for example, to control their state of 
being unidentifiable from a set of l different physical locations, such 
as churches, clinics, or offices.118 However, attributes do not neces-
sarily need to be a type of location. They can also be the driving 
speed, religion, or ethnicity of a person. Comparable to the for-
mation of an anonymity spatial region by selecting     individu-
als, l-diversity achieves privacy protection by extending an ano-
nymity spatial region until     different values of a sensitive at-
tribute are included.119 For example, if religion is the sensitive at-
tribute, the region is extended until it includes persons with     
different religions. That way it could be hidden that a person at-
tends a particular church service. 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
116 Id. at 16. 
117 See id. at 5. 
118 Bhuvan Bamba, Ling Liu, Peter Pesti & Ting Wang, Supporting Anonymous Loca-
tion Queries in Mobile Environments with Privacygrid, PROC. INT’L WWW CONFERENCE 
237, 239 (2008). 
119 See Byoungyoung Lee, Jinoh Oh, Hwanjo Yu & Jong Kim, Protecting Location 
Privacy Using Location Semantics, 14 PROC. ACM SIGKDD INT.L CONF. ON 
KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING , 1289, 1289 (2011). 
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IV. A MACHINE LEARNING APPROACH TO THE MOSAIC THEORY 
Having set up our tools—machine learning techniques and pri-
vacy metrics—we are now ready to consider how pervasive loca-
tion tracking impacts the Fourth Amendment in light of the mosaic 
theory. At its essence, the mosaic theory claims that in surveillance, 
the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. This means both that 
law enforcement can learn more than a simple tally of the collected 
data and that, at a certain point, law enforcement can learn dispro-
portionately more relative to the effort they have expended. With 
regard to this latter point, the practical concern is that the relative 
ease of data accumulation removes the economic check on abusive 
police activity that might otherwise exist. These insights of the mo-
saic theory raise troubling Fourth Amendment concerns. Machine 
learning demonstrates the truth of these propositions. 
Let us begin with the observation that accumulation of too 
much location information is itself troubling, for it can reveal inti-
mate facts about the target of the surveillance. As Justice Sotomayor 
expressed in her concurring opinion in Jones: 
Disclosed in [GPS] data . . . will be trips the indisputably 
private nature of which takes little imagination to conjure: 
trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion 
clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the criminal 
defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, 
the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and 
on.120
 
 
By making high-accuracy predictions based on limited data, this prob-
lem is exacerbated. Depending upon the predictions being made, the col-
lection of data can become more intrusive substantively. Furthermore, law 
                                                          
 
 
 
120 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting 
People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 441-42 (2009))). 
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enforcement is able to know more with considerably less effort.
121
 As Jus-
tice Alito stated in Jones, the economic aspect of automatic accumulation 
of data becomes increasingly troubling:  
In the pre-computer age, the greatest protections of privacy 
were neither constitutional nor statutory, but practical. Tra-
ditional surveillance for any extended period of time was 
difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken. The 
surveillance at issue in this case—constant monitoring of 
the location of a vehicle for four weeks—would have re-
quired a large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and per-
haps aerial assistance. Only an investigation of unusual im-
portance could have justified such an expenditure of law 
enforcement resources. Devices like the one used in the pre-
sent case, however, make long-term monitoring relatively 
easy and cheap.122 
The fact that location tracking is cheap (and even made cheaper by 
prediction) is seen as eroding a vital bulwark: “[B]ecause GPS monitoring 
is cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by 
design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that con-
strain abusive law enforcement practices: limited police resources and 
community hostility.” 123  Again, machine learning techniques lower the 
cost still more, and produce more data. Furthermore, the mechanisms are 
even more hidden from public scrutiny. 
The central question then is this: can the tracking, aggregation, and 
processing of data by machine learning algorithms constitute a search in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment? For the answer to this question to be 
                                                          
 
 
 
121 There is, of course, a considerably higher error rate in data generated by ma-
chine learning algorithms, as opposed to items directly observed. This raises the 
fascinating question of whether it requires more or fewer questions for law enforce-
ment to believe something that is not correct. 
122 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring). 
123 Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (internal quotations omitted). 
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“yes,” two things must be established. First, it must be true that more can 
be learned from the location tracking data than the sum of the information 
individually gathered (Subsections A. and B.). Second, it must be demon-
strated that the information learned is protected under the privacy test set 
forth in Katz by Justice Harlan
124
 (Subsections C. and D.). We must estab-
lish more than that, though. We must also show that the mosaic theory is 
an operationally useful approach to the Fourth Amendment (Subsection 
E.). 
A. THE EXISTENCE OF PREDICTABLE LOCATION PATTERNS 
Is it possible to learn more from location tracking data than the 
discrete units of data? The answer is a resounding “yes!” There are 
predictable patterns to people’s movements that can be derived 
from their past locations. A 2010 paper by Chaoming Song and oth-
er researchers demonstrates this proposition. Using a set of cell 
phone tower data points, they showed that human movement was 
93% predictable.125 Song and his co-authors note that the high de-
gree of “regularity is . . . potentially . . . intrinsic to human activi-
ties.”126 Moreover, “it is not the 93% predictability that [is] most 
surprising. Rather, it is the lack of variability in predictability across 
the population.”127 While the Song paper did not attempt to make 
actual predictions based upon the datasets it was using, the authors 
did conclude that the high degree of regularity that is found in hu-
                                                          
 
 
 
124 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
125 See Chaoming Song, Zehui Qu, Nicholas Blumm & Albert-László Barabási, Lim-
its of Predictability in Human Mobility, 327 SCIENCE 1018 (2010), 
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/suppl/2010/02/18/327.5968.1018.DC1/Song.
SOM.pdf. Mobile phone records provide location information only when a person 
uses his or her phone. Id. at 1019. The result is therefore based on the analysis of data 
from 45,000 users whose location was recorded for more than 20% of hourly intervals 
and whose location recordings were reliably extrapolated to 100% of hourly inter-
vals. Id. at 1019-20. 
126 Id. at 1021. 
127 Id. 
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man movement makes it likely that efforts at prediction would suc-
ceed.128 
In a more recent paper Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye and three 
co-authors present stronger results. They found that as few as four 
data points derived from coarse cell phone tower data could 
uniquely identify 95% of individuals.129 Their conclusions are un-
ambiguous: 
All together, the ubiquity of mobility datasets, the unique-
ness of human traces, and the information that can be in-
ferred from them highlight the importance of understand-
ing the privacy bounds of human mobility. We show that 
the uniqueness of human mobility traces is high and that 
mobility datasets are likely to be re-identifiable using in-
formation only on a few outside locations . . . . This implies 
that even coarse datasets provide little anonymity.130 
In order to find how many mobility data points are needed to 
uniquely identify an individual from a mobility trace, de Montjoye 
and his co-authors define    as the set composed of p mobility data 
points and  (  ) as the set of all traces that match the p points.
131 
Thus, for example, in the case of tracking three individuals in New 
York City from Union Square to Washington Square, given that 
these are the only two mobility data points, that is,    , there are 
                                                          
 
 
 
128 Id. 
129 See Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye, César A. Hidalgo, Michel Verleysen & Vin-
cent D. Blondel, Unique in the Crowd: The privacy bounds of human mobility, SCIENTIFIC 
REPORTS 1376 (March) http://www.nature.com/srep/2013/130325/srep01376/ 
pdf/srep01376.pdf. 
130 de Montjoye et al., supra note 129, at 2. 
131 Id. 
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three traces that match these points, | (    )|   .
132 From this in-
formation it is not possible to identify any of the three individuals. 
However, if one more mobility data point is obtained, that is,    , 
and if it turns out that one individual moves further to the East Vil-
lage, one to the West Village, and the third to Little Italy, three 
unique traces will emerge, | (    )|   . Therefore, this reduction in 
the cardinality of  (  ) from 3 to 1 leads to unique identification of 
all individuals. In this regard, de Montjoye and his co-authors note: 
[T]he information added by a point is highly dependent 
from the points already known. The amount of information 
gained by knowing one more point can be defined as the 
reduction of the cardinality of  (  ) associated with this ex-
tra point. The larger the decrease, the more useful the piece 
of information is. Intuitively, a point on the MIT campus at 
3AM is more likely to make a trace unique than a point in 
downtown Boston on a Friday evening.133 
In other words, adding a data point—another observation of 
someone’s location at a given time—can at times dramatically cut 
the size of  (  ), i.e., reduce the number of people whose behavior 
can be matched. Having more data points allows for a better identi-
fication. This fits well with the concept of k-anonymity: generally 
speaking, only a few points are necessary to reduce k to 1.134 
These results, as striking as they are, were obtained with ran-
dom data. However, as de Montjoye and his co-authors explain, not 
all data points are equally meaningful. In particular, they note that 
their random sampling tended to pick out “home” and “office” 
                                                          
 
 
 
132 The notation “| |   ” means “set X has cardinality 3”, i.e., there are 3 ele-
ments in that set. 
133 de Montjoye et al., supra note 129, at 3. 
134 See supra Section III.A (for an explanation of k-anonymity). 
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points, simply because people are there for longer time than they 
are on the road.135 They envision, however, a far more discriminate 
collection of data points: 
For the purpose of re-identification, more sophisticated ap-
proaches could collect points that are more likely to reduce 
the uncertainty, exploit irregularities in an individual’s be-
havior, or implicitly take into account information such as 
home and workplace or travels abroad. Such approaches 
are likely to reduce the number of locations required to 
identify an individual, vis-à-vis the average uniqueness of 
traces.136  
It is important to understand what these two papers do and do 
not say. Neither gives results that are likely to be of direct benefit to 
law enforcement. After all, if a comprehensive set of cell phone 
tower location records is available, there is no need to predict 
someone’s next location; law enforcement can simply demand ac-
cess to the database. However, the papers do indeed support the 
notion that there are patterns to people’s locations, patterns that are 
often unique, and which can, in principle, be used to learn more, 
and more easily, than is present in the records themselves. 
B. DETERMINING THE FORMATION OF A MOSAIC 
To demonstrate the correctness of the mosaic theory, we need to 
show that location information can answer prosecutors’ questions 
without the aspect in question being directly observable. This is the 
strongest theoretical contribution of machine learning to the mosaic 
theory. Experimental results do indeed validate our hypothesis that 
                                                          
 
 
 
135 de Montjoye et al., supra note 129, at 3. 
136 Id. (citation omitted). 
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a point can be objectively identified at which the collection of data 
becomes greater than the sum of its parts, in that it reveals infor-
mation not previously known. Consider, for example, a study per-
formed by Yaniv Altshuler and others.137 It can be observed that 
some (though not all) of their graphs show a sharp uptick in accura-
cy when monitoring has been done for a certain amount of time. 
Figure 1 is the most dramatic: after about 5 weeks of monitoring, 
and again after about 27 weeks, accuracy in identifying a subject’s 
ethnicity jumps quite sharply.  
 
 
Figure 2 is almost as striking; after the initial increase and a 
plateau, the accuracy in determining whether or not someone is 
American-born climbs substantially again around the 20 day mark. 
Such sharp changes in a graph provide an objective basis for defin-
ing the existence of a mosaic. Not only is the dataset producing 
                                                          
 
 
 
137 See Yaniv Altshuler et al. “Incremental learning with accuracy prediction of so-
cial and individual properties from mobile-phone data,” WS3P, IEEE Social Compu-
ting, 2012. 
Figure 1: This is Figure 10 from Altshuler et al. 
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more accurate predictions at these points of sharp change (i.e., pre-
viously unknown information is more likely to be revealed), but 
too, the output knowledge at these points is growing much faster 
than the input effort (i.e., law enforcement is learning more with 
considerably less effort). Effort is, of course, economic cost, per Jus-
tice Alito’s concurrence in Jones.138 These sharp upward bends in the 
curves are, therefore, crucial. To the extent that resistance to the 
mosaic theory is driven by concerns about incomprehensible line 
drawing, the upticks described above reflect that an objective basis 
for such line drawing does, in fact, exist. 
 
 
 
It is difficult to provide a formal mathematical definition of 
such an uptick. However, we can define it descriptively. Suppose 
we have a graph, similar to those in the Altshuler study, which re-
                                                          
 
 
 
138 See supra note 122. 
Figure 2: This is Figure 7 from Altshuler et al. 
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lates the amount of monitoring (in the figures on the x-axes) to the 
accuracy of a prediction (in the figures on the y-axes). Using 
straightforward, well-known techniques, one can fit a curve to those 
points. At any point on this curve, one can visualize its slope (i.e., 
how fast it is rising or falling).139 However, the slope at a certain 
point does not tell us what we need for the mosaic theory to hold 
because it tells us nothing about how the collection of data at one 
particular point compares with the collection at other points. Ra-
ther, all that a steep slope tells us is that a small amount of observa-
tion yields a large increase in accuracy. 
The change in the slope, however, is significant because it pro-
vides an objective measure for comparing the slope at different 
points in time. If the slope is increasing as more data points are con-
sidered, and especially if it is increasing rapidly, the change in slope 
tells us that we have a better chance of learning more proportional-
ly from later than from earlier observations.140 Once this transfor-
mation in the accuracy of factual predictions occurs, a mosaic has 
been formed. This is true because no longer is the government 
merely gathering information more efficiently. Rather, at these 
points on the curve, the government is more precisely generating 
previously unknown information. It is easily possible to visualize 
such a curve. Where a sharp bend upwards can be observed, a mo-
saic has been created. 
                                                          
 
 
 
139 The notion of the slope of a curve at a given point is well defined mathemati-
cally; in calculus, it is known as the first derivative of the equation of the curve. 
140 The rate of change of the slope—the first derivative—is known, not surprising-
ly, as the second derivative. 
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We have illustrated this in Figure 3 using a made-up, but realis-
tically shaped graph. 
 
Figure 4 is a close-up of the crucial section of the graph.        
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: This is a synthetic (i.e., utterly made up, and not corresponding to any real experi- 
ment) graph showing the accuracy of predictions after some number of hours. Note the lines  
showing the slope at several points. The curve is assumed to have been fitted. 
Figure 4: A close-up of the previous graph showing the slope at several points. 
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Each data point gives the accuracy of predictions after that number 
of hours of observation of the target, based on a (presumed) train-
ing dataset. There are lines showing the slope at several different 
points. Table 1 shows the second derivative of the curve, i.e., the 
rate of change of the slope. Note the relatively small change after 
just a few hours of observation, compared with the very large 
change from 96 to 108 hours. Also, as can be noted, the change be-
comes smaller after 108 hours. This increase, and later decrease, is 
crucial. It indicates that a mosaic has been formed, probably around 
the 108 hours point. If another similar increase and decrease were to 
be observed at a later point, it could be disregarded as the mosaic 
was already established at an earlier point, a lower bound. 
Hours Second deriva-
tive x10,000 
0 0.02661 
12 0.04063 
24 0.06187 
36 0.09379 
48 0.14126 
60 0.21060 
72 0.30916 
84 0.44334 
96 0.61357 
108 0.80490 
120 0.97413 
Table 1: The second derivative of the slope at certain points. 
To make the determination if, and at what point, a mosaic has 
been formed, that is, when enough is enough, the analyst would 
have to take an appropriate set of data, train the models, see what 
correlations form, and draw the accuracy curves just discussed. 
Where the mosaic forms is dependent on the training dataset used, 
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the predictive algorithm employed, and the precise question being 
asked. Each of these three criteria raises questions. 
Of the three criteria, the possession of large amounts of data by 
law enforcement is the most studied, though not in the context of 
training a machine learning algorithm.141 In general, there are many 
types of data that the government cannot legally collect, or can col-
lect only subject to stringent limitations. These same datasets, how-
ever, may be readily available to the private sector. In such situa-
tions, government agencies, including law enforcement agencies, 
have simply purchased data from large-scale data brokers.142 Thus, 
for now, we assume that suitable datasets exist and can be obtained, 
perhaps in anonymized form, and perhaps accessible to law en-
forcement only to answer particular questions, rather than for gen-
eral use.143 
Given their availability, the choice of the training data raises 
troubling questions. In general, the better the training data match a 
target, the more accurate the predictions will be. Consider, for ex-
ample, the location patterns of a stay-at-home mother and a deliv-
                                                          
 
 
 
141 See, e.g., Fabio Arcila, GPS Tracking Out of Fourth Amendment Dead Ends: United 
States v. Jones and the Katz Conundrum, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2012); Stephanie Pell et al., 
supra note 12; see also Recommendations for Fusion Centers, THE CONST. PROJECT, 
http://constitutionproject.org/pdf/fusioncenterreport.pdf. 
142 One case in point is non-content information about subscribers to electronic 
communications and remote computing services. Carriers are explicitly prohibited 
from providing this type of information to the government unless a suitable court 
order is presented or other exceptions are applicable; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(c)(6), 
2703(c). 
143 Data anonymization is remarkably hard. See, e.g., Paul Ohm, Broken Promises 
of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L.REV. 
1701 (2010). The computer science literature also gives many examples showing that 
simply being able to ask questions about the behavior of aggregates in an otherwise-
inaccessible database or using outside information on an anonymized dataset can 
still leak information. See ,e.g., Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust de-
anonymization of large sparse datasets, PROC. OF THE 2008 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SEC. AND 
PRIVACY (SP) 111 (2008). 
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ery-truck driver. They are clearly quite different. Using patterns 
that are similar to the target’s behavior will result in better predic-
tions. While that itself raises issues, such as the compilation of train-
ing datasets along ethnic or racial lines, those concerns are beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
Obtaining and selecting training data is not the only point to 
consider. Formation of a mosaic also depends on the selected algo-
rithm. Algorithms are not static. As in many fields of computer sci-
ence, there has been rapid progress in recent years. An algorithm 
that represents a breathtaking advance one year may be common-
place the next and obsolescent the year after that. This in turn 
means that determinations of when a mosaic has formed, and, 
hence, when a warrant should be procured, are also not static. Ra-
ther, the question must be reexamined at reasonable intervals, cer-
tainly no less frequently than every few years. That said, police are 
increasingly relying on sophisticated predictive software.144 In Santa 
Cruz, California, for example, an experimental trial used such soft-
ware to affect police deployment patterns: 
[. . . ] Santa Cruz’s method is more sophisticated than most. 
Based on models for predicting aftershocks from earth-
quakes, it generates projections about which areas and 
windows of time are at highest risk for future crimes by an-
alyzing and detecting patterns in years of past crime data. 
                                                          
 
 
 
144 Obviously, skilled investigators are also adept at making deductions from pat-
terns of data simply based on their experience. For example, one former police officer 
made the following comment to us: “It is no secret that Friday and Saturday nights 
are big with the drug trade. Sometimes money changes hands on Mondays early. 
That pays for last week’s product and [serves as a] down payment for next week’s 
product. A Monday mid-day visit is a tell. If that follows with a Thursday visit and is 
consistent, we know we have a pick-up, drop-off location. If the same people go to 
different places, but it follows a pattern, we know when shipments are being made.” 
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The projections are recalibrated daily, as new crimes occur 
and updated data is fed into the program.145 
In one case use of the program turned out to be crucial for ar-
resting two female suspects; one with an outstanding warrant and 
the other one carrying illegal drugs. “On the day the women were 
arrested, [. . . ], the program identified the approximately one-
square-block area where the parking garage [in which the women 
were arrested] is situated as one of the highest-risk locations for car 
burglaries.”146 This success of technologically enhanced police work 
illustrates that we can expect increasingly more algorithmic use of 
location data by the police. 
In addition to training data and algorithms, the set of questions 
that can be asked is also relevant for the formation of a mosaic. As 
we saw from the Altshuler study, in order to achieve a certain pre-
dictive accuracy, different questions demand different amounts of 
data.147 The set of questions that might be asked, however, is quite 
large, and generally both fact-specific and dependent on the stage of 
the investigation: 
If law enforcement had a known target, but was otherwise 
unaware or only had minimal information about the tar-
get’s “criminal associates,” law enforcement would want to 
identify those potential criminal associates (which may oc-
cur initially through analysis of location data, other meth-
ods, or a combination of methods which can include loca-
tion data) and then track those potential associates to see 
where they go and who they meet with. It may be that, in 
this circumstance, law enforcement has very little infor-
                                                          
 
 
 
145 See, e.g., Erica Goode, Sending the Police Before There’s a Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Au-
gust 16, 2011. 
146 Id. 
147 See Altshuler et al., supra note 10.  
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mation about the newly identified “associates,” but the 
monitoring of their movements can reveal information 
about the modus operandi of the organization (to include 
roles and “criminal knowledge” of various individuals in 
the organization)—additional important insights beyond 
just “where did they go.”148 
Although it is probably feasible to come up with a canonical, 
albeit somewhat large, set of fairly standard questions, it is less 
clear that this would be entirely satisfactory. For one thing, the set 
of facts in a given case can be wildly different than anything en-
countered before.149 Perhaps even more seriously, the set of ques-
tions an investigator should ask may differ from what is actually 
asked or intuited. In this sense, machine learning and mosaic theory 
may raise Equal Protection or Due Process questions, which we flag 
but not explore further. 
C. APPLYING PRIVACY METRICS 
So far, we have discussed the existence of mosaics and how 
their formation can be detected. Now, we must show how mosaics 
can be integrated into the reasonable expectation of privacy test. To 
that end, we use notions of the different privacy metrics that are 
proposed in the computer science literature and that we discussed 
earlier.150 We focus on two metrics that are most promising for ac-
complishing our task: k-anonymity and l-diversity. However, before 
we discuss how k-anonymity and l-diversity motivate our ap-
                                                          
 
 
 
148 Private communication with Stephanie Pell. Pell is a former federal prosecutor 
who worked on national security cases. 
149 See, e.g., the scenario described in Stephanie Pell & Christopher Soghoian. supra 
note 12, at n.150, which is based on a real investigation. 
150 See supra Section III. 
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proach, we briefly describe some of the major obstacles preventing 
their direct application. 
In order to see why k-anonymity and l-diversity cannot be ap-
plied directly, it first should be noted that both metrics in their orig-
inal form are inherently limited. This limitation is a consequence of 
their development for the purpose of preventing identification of 
individuals in databases. They were not meant to provide a general 
and comprehensive privacy metric. Rather, they are tools for creat-
ing degrees of anonymity within databases that prevent particular 
entries from being conclusively linked to known identities. It would 
be peculiar to describe the protections of the Fourth Amendment as 
primarily concerned with encouraging this sort of randomization.151 
Further, in the location tracking context, k-anonymity and l-
diversity are mainly used for providing anonymity to users of loca-
tion-based web services; an application that is very different from 
the location tracking of suspects in police investigations. Both pri-
vacy metrics generally assume a three-party scenario in which a 
trusted third party, for example, a cell phone network provider, 
knows the exact location of a user and then forwards only an im-
precise anonymity spatial region to the requesting location-based 
service. Thus, the exact location of the user is only hidden from the 
location-based service, but not from the network provider. Howev-
er, our scenario will often not involve a network provider or other 
trusted third party. Rather, the location information is transmitted 
directly from the tracking device to the police. Even if a third party 
is involved, the police may be able to obtain the location infor-
mation from that party. 
                                                          
 
 
 
151 But see Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth 
Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 809 (2010), 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/530-317-bh-fourth-amendment_0.pdf. 
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A final—and central—definitional limitation concerns what is 
to be protected. Privacy violations can only occur for protected in-
formation. The challenge, therefore, is defining the class of infor-
mation worthy of protection. While k-anonymity prohibits the dis-
closure of identifiers and l-diversity extends this prohibition to qua-
si-identifiers, the class of protected information for our purposes is 
characterized by the reasonable expectation of privacy, which has 
some overlap with k-anonymity and l-diversity but is not complete-
ly congruent with those metrics. Given this and the other previous-
ly described limitations, the usefulness of k-anonymity and l-
diversity may seem doubtful. However, the situation is not entirely 
bleak. Despite their constraints, it is possible to leverage their gen-
eral ideas. 
Considering k-anonymity first, one attribute of a person is pro-
tected: identity. By definition, k-anonymity is concerned with size k 
of the group that satisfies certain criteria; when    , the subject is 
perfectly identified. We see this described by de Montjoye and co-
authors: very few people’s location traces correspond to the same 
set of four observations.152 That is, with four observations,     
with high probability. There are certainly scenarios where this 
might be of interest. For example, suppose that a crime takes place 
in a certain locale. Given training data from a certain population 
and a set of after the fact location data for one particular suspect, is 
this person “predicted” to have been in that locale at the time the 
crime was committed?153 This prediction is possible because correla-
tions are not restricted to predicting future acts. We can use those 
correlations to ask “whose earlier location is predicted to be most 
                                                          
 
 
 
152 See supra Section IV.0 
153 The tenses admittedly are odd in that sentence. Nevertheless, they are correct 
when applying location data to a prior act. 
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consistent with the known later locations of a group of suspects?” In 
other words, we are running the algorithm backwards in time. 
In contrast to k-anonymity, l-diversity deals with a larger set of 
protected attributes: quasi-identifiers. In general, any attribute can 
be specified as a quasi-identifier and for each there must be at least l 
possible values. However, it is an open research question how l-
diversity—or k-anonymity, for that matter 154—can be reconciled 
with and mapped to the output of machine learning algorithms. 
Such mapping is necessary because the algorithms yield an accura-
cy rate in terms of probability, rather than supplying a set of l-
diverse “well represented” answers.155 Therefore, in order to over-
come this disconnect, we either need experiments that give answers 
in terms of l-diversity or a different privacy metric in terms of guess 
accuracy. We propose the former and provide a simple rule for 
converting probabilities into an l-diverse answer: Given that a ma-
chine learning algorithm returns a probability, p, for the existence of 
an attribute, it holds that   ⌊   ⌋.156 
Let us illustrate our rule by an example. If investigators believe 
that a suspected drug dealer driving in his car picked up a bag con-
taining drugs in San Francisco, the machine learning algorithm may 
return a 40% probability for a pick-up stop in San Francisco.157 This 
result can be translated into 2-diversity. Now, why is that the case? 
In general, the probabilities for selecting the correct answer from 
two possibilities at random would be 50%, from three possibilities 
                                                          
 
 
 
154 It is possible to view k-anonymity as a special case of l-diversity. If identity is 
the only attribute of interest, saying that there must be l possible values of that at-
tribute is equivalent to saying that    . 
155 An answer is “well represented” in terms of l-diversity if an attribute is hidden 
among a total of l attributes. For a discussion of l-diversity see supra Section III.0 
156 The floor notation ⌊ ⌋    means that y equals the largest integer not greater 
than x. Thus, for example, ⌊   ⌋   . 
157 It is possible to predict a drop-off or pick-up trip with relatively high accuracy. 
See infra Section IV.0 
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33.1/3%, from four 25%, and so on. Thus, if the probability returned 
from the machine learning algorithm is greater than 50%, there is a 
higher chance of being correct when selecting this answer com-
pared to any other answer. This can be interpreted as 1-diversity. 
However, if the probability returned is not greater than 50%, but 
greater than 33.1/3%, we have 2-diversity. If it is not greater than 
33.1/3%, but greater than 25%, 3-diversity, and so on. Because in 
our example the probability that the suspect picked up something 
in San Francisco is 40%, it holds that   ⌊     ⌋  ⌊   ⌋   , that is, 
our mapping creates 2-diversity. 
The demonstrated conversion rule leads to another observation. 
The rule in fact provides a rationale based on k-anonymity and l-
diversity for quantifying a reasonable expectation of privacy viola-
tion at a 50% probability threshold. Whatever question the investi-
gators ask, it must be checked if the probability of the answer is 
greater than 50%. If that is the case, the corresponding answer is 
more likely to be correct than all others. Consequently, the predic-
tion of an attribute (in case of l-diversity) or the identification of the 
suspect (in case of k-anonymity) is more likely to be successful than 
not and we have 1-diversity and 1-anonymity, respectively. Given 
such result and given that the type of information asked for is pro-
tected as well, a point we will address in the next subsection,158 the 
50% probability threshold is crossed and a privacy violation exists. 
If either k-anonymity or l-diversity are used in the manner de-
scribed, they import a probabilistic understanding of privacy into 
the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis. In this regard, as 
noted earlier,159 the attempts at a purely quantitative definition of, 
for example, “probable cause” have failed to garner support from a 
majority of the Court. Of course, one reason they have not been 
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adopted is because judging is not quantitative. We do not, for ex-
ample, have juries saying, “the probability that this person is guilty 
is 83%” and then comparing that against the “reasonable doubt” 
threshold. However, the Court’s reluctance to quantify legal con-
cepts like probable cause does not stand as an impediment to the 
proposal here—quantification of objective reasonableness. Our ap-
plication of k-anonymity or l-diversity provides an objective ra-
tionale for the probabilistic quantification of reasonableness and, 
after all, the Court has indicated a willingness to adopt quantitative 
understandings of legal concepts on far more tenuous grounds than 
the instant proposal.160 
Moreover, while the Court has repeatedly instructed that the 
“probable cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quan-
tification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and 
depends on the totality of the circumstances,”161 it has also simulta-
neously suggested that the protections of the Fourth Amendment 
may rise or fall based upon the quantity and quality of information 
sought by law enforcement.162 Consequently, there has to date been 
no suggestion that science might not provide an objective basis for 
quantifying privacy. Quite the opposite should hold true, even 
more so as the mosaic theory can be seamlessly integrated into the 
traditional Katz test for determining violations of reasonable expec-
tations of privacy. 
D. DETERMINING A PRIVACY VIOLATION 
In order to establish a case for the mosaic theory, the final nec-
essary step is to show that machine learning techniques can indeed 
violate the reasonable expectation of privacy. We assert that it will 
                                                          
 
 
 
160 Id. 
161 Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003). 
162 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
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be a Fourth Amendment violation if machine learning techniques 
are used to deduce facts that are not otherwise ascertainable with-
out violating clearly established principles, most fundamentally the 
privacy protections originating from the privacy of the home.163 
Without question, this is just a starting point; as the science devel-
ops, so too will our objective understanding of the applicable legal 
rules. 
Suppose that it were possible to learn—with high probability 
and solely by looking at location data—that a couple was estranged 
and were sleeping in separate rooms. This is undeniably private 
information, perhaps even more so than “at what hour each night 
the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath.” 164  This 
sounds like an improbable thing to learn; nevertheless, one reason 
machine learning is so valuable is that it can discover such correla-
tions, even if no one can explain the causality.165 
Kyllo makes this observation very clear: “We think that obtain-
ing by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the 
interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained 
without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area 
constitutes a search.”166 In the language of Kyllo, machine learning is 
a “sense-enhancing technology.” It allows the detection of infor-
mation that otherwise would be hidden from human observation. 
                                                          
 
 
 
163 See supra Section I.0 
164 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001). 
165 It is important to remember that machine learning works by finding correla-
tions, rather than by identifying causal relationships. We can imagine a scenario, e.g., 
that a man who regularly spends Saturday nights at a strip club does so because he’s 
estranged from his wife, but machine learning does not make that leap; it simply 
finds the pattern. The prediction can be wrong, perhaps because he is an employee 
rather than a guest, or because he is a plumber who is regularly called out to repair 
balky pipes, or because this is how a happy couple has chosen to spend their Satur-
day nights together. That does not invalidate the correlation, which simply says that 
most men with such a location pattern are unhappy in their marriages. 
166 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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It should be noted, however, that machine learning per se is not 
the issue. Sufficient datasets are also required. Given their availabil-
ity, the aggregation of publicly observable movements can be trans-
formed from a chronicle of where the target has been into some-
thing different and new, something much more meaningful and 
invasive. With such application of machine learning algorithms to 
location tracking data, a substantive change in the police investiga-
tion occurs, not simply a change in the investigation’s form. 
While it is true that most of the location tracking data is likely 
obtained from the tracked individual’s movements in public, the 
information deduced from the analysis of the aggregated public 
data does not need to be. Rather, it can be of a very intimate nature. 
The deduced information can be of a type and nature that is pro-
tected under the evolved interpretation of what constitutes the pri-
vacy of the home and its reduced dependency on physical bounda-
ries.167 If that is the case, it must be protected. This way, even nomi-
nally public behavior can be protected. 
In the end, which information is awarded Fourth Amendment 
protection depends on societal expectations. The “reasonable expec-
tation of privacy” of today’s Fourth Amendment doctrine accom-
modates this notion and is explicitly couched in terms of societal 
expectations, i.e., what people as a whole believe is “reasonable.” 
Consider again Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz: “there is a two-
fold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (sub-
jective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be 
one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”168 
Societal expectations, though, are based on what is customary, 
and customary behavior by law enforcement is based in part on 
                                                          
 
 
 
167 See supra Section I.0 
168 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis add-
ed). 
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economic factors and is limited by what people will put up with. 
Thus, visits to “the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion 
clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense 
attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, 
synagogue or church, the gay bar”169 are protected information un-
der the Fourth Amendment if contemporary societal expectations 
consider them private. 
E. A NOTIONAL EXPERIMENT 
We now propose an experiment to determine, in advance, 
where the mosaic boundaries are, that is, at what point location 
tracking requires a warrant in order to not violate the tracked indi-
vidual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. This experiment has not 
been performed and it is not clear that it actually can be, in particu-
lar, given the uncertainty about the set of questions the police may 
want to ask, the different algorithms that could be employed, and 
the different types of location data that can be collected. However, 
assuming that it is possible to perform the experiment, ideally, de-
termination of a mosaic in any given situation, or perhaps for a giv-
en time and place—say, New York City one week from now—
would be done ahead of time. 
The experiment would begin by selecting training data similar 
to the type of data to be analyzed. Then, the general procedure 
would be to compile a standard set of questions, based on questions 
investigators intend to ask during an investigation and facts that are 
believed to be learnable. From this set of questions, those felt to be 
innocuous or permissible are discarded. The remainder—questions 
whose answers are intrusive enough to potentially violate a per-
son’s reasonable expectation of privacy (as described previously)170 
                                                          
 
 
 
169 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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or which are impermissible for law enforcement use (for example, 
as a matter of Due Process)—can be used to create the training da-
taset and to query a test dataset. From the resulting test dataset 
curves, one for each question (and perhaps for each ques-
tion/algorithm pair), the analyst can see if and where a mosaic 
forms, and obtain a warrant, if necessary. 
To our knowledge this procedure has not yet been carried out. 
Therefore, the absence of such research prevents us, at this time, 
from giving candidate values for certain standard sets of data, algo-
rithms, and questions: a day, a week, a month. The kinds of ques-
tions a law enforcement officer might ask are not those that have 
typically been examined in the computer science literature. Howev-
er, despite the lack of specific research in this area, a general trend is 
already emerging, that is, location patterns generally form accord-
ing to the regular organization of human life.171 This regularity may 
serve as a basis for approximating mosaic formation. In particular, 
human activities repeat a high degree of regularity from one week 
to another.172 
In this regard, a human mobility study by Adam Sadilek and 
John Krumm shows that, while the location of someone in the dis-
tant future is in general highly independent of the recent location, 
“it is likely to be a good predictor of [the person’s] location exactly 
one week from now.”173 This result is not surprising and intuitively 
the case in many realms of life as discussed, for example, in the of-
ten week-based regularity and organization of the drug trade.174 
Looking at even smaller time increments, Song and his co-authors 
                                                          
 
 
 
171 Chaoming Song et al., supra note 125, at 1018. 
172  Tao Jia & Bin Jiang, Exploring Human Activity Patterns Using Taxicab Static 
Points, 1 ISPRS INT. J. GEO-INF. 89 (2012). 
173 Adam Sadilek & John Krumm, Far Out: Predicting Long-Term Human Mobility, 
PROC. OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH AAAI CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2012). 
174 Supra Section IV.0  
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have observed a high degree of potential predictability from daily 
mobility patterns.175 Based on these findings, and in absence of any 
more specific experimental results, the location tracking of someone 
for more than a week without a warrant appears to be an upper 
bound in the average case. 176  However, as noted, 177  algorithms 
change. Therefore, this upper bound may become smaller over 
time. Tracking the location of a person for even just a few days may 
be enough to reveal a lot of protected information. 
For example, various studies aim to deduce the trip purpose 
from location data collected for less than a week. In an early study, 
Jean Wolf and co-authors equipped survey participants with GPS 
devices for three-day periods and found that it was possible to de-
rive whether a person was going home, to work, or had a different 
trip purpose with an accuracy of 93.38%.178 In a similar experiment 
Zhongwei Deng and Minhe Ji classified trip purposes into seven 
categories: going to work, going to school, going home, picking-up 
or dropping-off, shopping or recreation, business visit, and other 
activities. 179  They were able to achieve an overall accuracy of 
87.6%.180 Obviously, this type of information gives law enforcement 
                                                          
 
 
 
175 Chaoming Song et al., supra note 125, at 1020. 
176 In his proposal for a statutory implementation of the mosaic theory, Christo-
pher Slobogin suggests that searches lasting longer than 48 hours should require a 
warrant unless exigent circumstances exist. Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of 
United States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic 
Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 24 (2012). Drawing the line at 48 hours 
is informed by the length of time the government may hold an arrestee before a 
judge must be consulted. Id. at 25. However, as Slobogin states, this line drawing is 
not related to the intrusiveness of the search and, in this sense, arbitrary. Id. at 26. 
177 See supra Section IV.0 
178 Jean Wolf et al., Elimination of the Travel Diary: An Experiment to Derive Trip Pur-
pose from Global Positioning System Travel Data, 1768 TRANSP. RES. REC. 125 (2001). 
179 Zhongwei Deng & Minhe Ji, Deriving Rules for Trip Purpose Identification from 
GPS Travel Survey Data and Land Use Data: A Machine Learning Approach, TRAFFIC AND 
TRANSPORTATION STUDIES 768 (2010). 
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a good gauge, for example, to determine where a suspected drug 
dealer went for picking-up or dropping-off drugs or money, how-
ever; it can also reveal an abundance of protected information about 
the targeted person. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
At least in principle, machine learning lets us answer one of the 
key challenges posed by the mosaic theory: how to tell if a mosaic 
exists. In his piece on the mosaic theory, Fourth Amendment schol-
ar Orin Kerr notes181 the three different expectation of privacy theo-
ries for prolonged location tracking in the opinions by Justice Alito 
(“a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not have 
anticipated”), 182  Justice Sotomayor (“a manner that enables the 
Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and 
religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on”),183 and Judge Ginsburg 
(“the likelihood a stranger would observe all . . . movements [of a 
person over the course of a month] is not just remote, it is essential-
ly nil”).184 Machine learning provides clear objective support for the 
first two theories advanced: it can find surprising correlations, and 
it permits retrospective inquiries into many different facets of pri-
vate behavior.185 
In principle, machine learning also lets us draw lines beyond 
which a mosaic definitely exists; the process described in this article 
lets us measure the degree of intrusiveness (i.e., the loss of privacy) 
of any given set of location observations. Unfortunately, the neces-
sary experiments have not been carried out and the current tech-
                                                          
 
 
 
181 See Kerr, supra note 2, at 330. 
182 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
183 Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
184 See United States v. Maynard, 61 F.3d. 544, 560 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
185 Judge Ginsburg’s theory can be already met with the location tracking as such 
and does not require any machine learning analysis of the recorded data. 
2014]      MOSAIC THEORY & MACHINE LEARNING   
 
 
 
627 
nical privacy metrics cannot be integrated into the mosaic theory 
without modification. The latter point also has to do with the lack of 
a generally applicable privacy metric. It will be an important task 
for the future to come up with a metric that is mathematically 
sound, technically useful, and legally relevant. 
The development of the legal doctrine for location tracking is in 
its infancy. While we provide a basic framework and general rules, 
there are many details that can have an impact on the legal analysis 
as the doctrine further develops. For example, it may be that differ-
ent types of location tracking mandate different legal treatment. 
Particularly, the fine granularity of GPS tracking data may create a 
mosaic much faster than cell phone tower data would.186 Addition-
ally, it could play a role how close the location tracker is to the 
tracked person. For example, because a cell phone is usually carried 
around when people leave their homes,187 its GPS can provide, in 
many cases, more accurate location tracking data than a GPS device 
attached to a car. The analysis may also be further complicated by 
the aggregation of different types of information, for example, 
when location tracking information is aggregated with other infor-
mation contained in government databases. The legal and computer 
                                                          
 
 
 
186 Some courts already applied such distinction. See, e.g., United States v. Rig-
maiden, 2013 LEXIS 65633, *35-36 (“The Court cannot conclude that . . . use of cell-
site information, obtained from a third party under the [Stored Communications 
Act], is tantamount to attaching a GPS device to a person's vehicle . . . . The calcula-
tions [made from the historical cellsite information] merely identified a general area . 
. . .”); United States v. Graham, 2012 WL 691531, *6 (noting that “the GPS location 
data at issue in Maynard was far more precise than the historical cell site location 
data at issue here”). But see United States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759, 767-68 (E.D. 
Mich. 2013) (evaluating both cell phone tower data and GPS phone data under the 
same Fourth Amendment standard). 
187 A study found that keys, cash, and phone are the objects that most people con-
sider essential when leaving home. See Jan Chipchase, Per Persson, Petri Piippo. 
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science communities should work collaboratively to answer these, 
and many more questions, in the time to come. Moreover, as such 
advances are made, the law on location tracking should continue to 
keep step with the current state of scientific discovery. 
